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Preface 
 
This is the Danish national report in the international research project 
‘BARSORIS: Bargaining for Social Rights at Sector Level’. The project has 
been financed by EU, European Commission DG Employment, Social Affairs 
and Inclusion, Social Dialogue, Industrial Relations (Agreement number. 
VS/2013/0403). Duration: December 2013 – January 2015. Project Manage-
ment: Universiteit van Amsterdam (AIAS). Research consortium: The 
BARSORIS partners are: Universiteit van Amsterdam (AIAS), Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut-Hans- Böckler-Stiftung (HBS), Employment 
Relations Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen (FAOS), Central 
European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI), Universitat Autonoma de Barcelo-
na (UAB), The University of Teramo (UNITE), University of Leicester 
(ULEIC), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU). The Dutch Trade Union Confed-
eration FNV has also committed itself to provide support to the project. This 
communication related to the action BARSORIS is made by the beneficiaries 
and it reflects only the author’s view. The Commission is not responsible for 
any use that may be made of the information it contains. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A wide range of employment types coexist alongside the traditional full-time 
open-ended contract in the Danish labour market. Whilst some employment 
types, such as part-time work and temporary agency work (TAW), have become 
more common in recent years, others, such as fixed-term contracts and self-
employment have remained relatively stable. 28 percent of the workforce is 
estimated to hold an employment contract that no longer reflects the traditional 
full-time permanent position (Scheuer, 2011a). Although Danish legislation and 
collective agreements, in principle and in most cases, ensure these workers 
similar rights as comparable employees in permanent full-time positions, some 
groups may de facto face a greater risk of precariousness.  
Danish social partners rarely use the terms ‘precarious’ and ‘atypical work-
er’ (DA, 2013; Mailand and Larsen, 2011). In fact, these terms are highly dis-
puted among social partners in Denmark, and no consensus exists as to which 
groups of employees can be considered precarious (DA, 2013; Scheuer, 2011b). 
In this report, and in accordance with the focus of the whole research project, 
‘precariousness’ refers to employment with a low level of wages, a low level of 
job security, a low level of social security (incl. unemployment benefits and 
pensions), involuntary and short working hours, a lack of ‘voice’ and workload 
challenges. It is important to emphasise that we do not have a strict definition of 
job precariousness. Instead, in this study we will discuss to what extent the job 
includes problems or risks of precariousness. Moreover, it is important to note 
that not all forms of employment that deviate from the traditional full-time 
open-ended contract should or can be considered precarious. Indeed, it depends 
on the circumstances and varies across countries and sectors. Employment types 
other than the traditional full-time permanent position can in many cases meet 
both employers’ and employees’ demands for flexibility and provide sufficient 
income and acceptable wages and working conditions. Such types of employ-
ment can also be a stepping-stone to open-ended  fulltime contracts in the la-
bour market (Mailand and Larsen, 2011; DA, 2013a; Scheuer, 2011b). Further-
more, a full-time permanent position is no guarantee of protection from the 
challenges of precariousness.  
This report consists of seven chapters. The second chapter briefly reviews 
the recent development in distinct employment types in Denmark, including 
social partners’ general approach to atypical work. Chapters three, four, five and 
six review the recent development of atypical employment in four selected sec-
tors, including the wage and working conditions of atypical workers and social 
partners’ approach to atypical work.– The TAW, hospital, industrial cleaning 
and construction sectors were selected because they included various forms of 
employment contracts and cover quite different types of labour markets. Chap-
ter seven includes a cross-sector comparison along with a discussion of social 
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partners’ approaches to atypical work and the main drivers behind the recent 
developments.  
Methodically, the chapters draw on secondary material, interviews with six 
representatives from the employers’ associations and eight interviews with trade 
union representatives conducted from April to September 2014. Where nothing 
else is stated in the report, the source of information is these interviews. Due to 
the promise of full anonymity to a number of interviewees, a list of interviews 
has not been included in the report. We are thankful for the contributions of the  
interviewees to the report. 
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2. Recent development in employment types in Denmark 
 
In this chapter, we first briefly review the general development of distinct em-
ployment types: part-time work, including marginal part-time work, fixed-term 
contracts, self-employed without employees, TAW and flexi-jobbers in the 
Danish labour market. In the literature, these employment types are often con-
sidered as being related to precariousness. Secondly, we briefly review social 
partners’ general approach to these employment types before, in the following 
chapters, we analyse in greater detail the recent development of these employ-
ment types and social partners’ responses to them within four selected sectors: 
the TAW sector, hospitals, the industrial cleaning sector and the construction 
sector. 
 
2.1 Different employment types in the Danish labour market 
In the Danish context, part-time work is typically defined as working less than 
37 hours per week. Danish social partners do typically not consider part-time 
work to be precarious. However, in this project we argue that part-time workers 
can in some instances be considered to be at greater risk of precariousness in so 
far as part-time work (1) is involuntary and/or (2) involves a low number of 
weekly hours, which affects part-time workers’ eligibility for unemployment 
benefits, occupational pensions and other social benefits along with their ability 
to maintain a reasonable living standard. However, we cannot point to a precise 
number of weekly hours which divides part-time work with problems of precar-
iousness from part-time work without these problems. Regarding unemploy-
ment benefits, though, a rough indicator is the threshold which stipulates that a 
part-time worker needs to have worked the equivalent of 52 full-time weeks 
during the last three years to qualify for unemployment benefits. In other words, 
a part-time worker, on average, needs to have worked at least 13 hours per week 
over a five-day period during a continuous three-year period to qualify for un-
employment benefits. The term marginal part-time work will also be used and is 
here defined as less than 15 working hours per week.  
Part-time work is relatively widespread in the Danish labour market, with 
one in four employees holding a part-time job, and 9 percent work less than 15 
hours per week in 2013 (Eurostat, 2014a; Statistics Denmark, 2014a). Most 
have voluntarily opted for a part-time job for various reasons. However, alt-
hough 18 percent of Danish part-time workers have involuntarily ended up in 
such a position, it is important to stress that only a non-specified share of those 
holding a (in)voluntary part-time job can be considered to be at greater risk of 
precariousness (Eurostat, 2014c; Mailand and Larsen, 2011).  
Regarding fixed-term contracts, Danish collective agreements and labour 
law distinguish between three types of fixed-term workers based on the occur-
rence of a specific event, a project contract and a specific date for termination. 
Being a fixed-term worker does not necessarily mean being precarious. Some 
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employees voluntarily opt for a fixed-term position. Therefore, a fixed-term 
worker can be considered to be at greater risk of precariousness only if, similar 
to some part-time workers, (1) they have involuntarily ended up in a fixed-term 
position, (2) they have relatively few weekly hours, which affects their eligibil-
ity to social benefits and income levels, and (3) their employment contract is 
short-term and thereby affects their eligibility for social benefits and employ-
ment security. In 2014, 9 percent of Danish employees held a fixed-term con-
tract, and one in two fixed-term workers had ended up in such a position invol-
untarily – a number that had increased from 41 percent in 2000 (Eurostat, 
2014d). In addition, 48 percent of fixed-term workers had a contract of one year 
or more, but 24 percent held a contract of less than six months, and although 
this number is comparatively lower than in 2000, this latter group faces a great-
er risk of precariousness (Eurostat, 2014e). Their short-term contract makes it 
difficult for them to meet the assessment criteria for social benefits outlined in 
the collective agreements and the labour law despite being covered in principle 
(see chapters on hospitals, construction and industrial cleaning).  
The definition of temporary agency work follows the European directive. A 
temporary agency worker (‘temp’) is here defined as ‘a worker with a contract 
of employment or an employment relationship with a temporary work agency 
with a view to being assigned to a user undertaking to work temporarily under 
its supervision and direction’ (EU, 2008). 
The extent to which temps can be considered to be precariously employed 
depends on similar criteria as those for fixed-term contracts and part-time work. 
In Denmark, 0.8 percent of the workforce were temps in 2012, but no figures 
exist as to the length of their contract, their number of weekly hours or whether 
they (in)voluntarily had opted for such a job (Statistics Denmark, 2014c).  
 
Figure 2.1: Employment types as a percentage of the workforce aged 15–64 
years in Denmark, 2000–2013 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat (2014a); European Commission (2012); Statistics Denmark (2014a; 2014b); 
Arbejderbevægelsens Erhvervsråd (2009); CIETT (2014); Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen (2011; 2014). 
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A person is considered self-employed without employees if he/she receives no 
payslips, issues invoices, works at his/her own expense and is not assigned the 
instruction of others (Ballebye et al., 2009). Self-employed persons typically 
fall into two groups – namely, those considered ‘normal’ employees and those 
self-employed in their own business. In some instances, Danish labour law con-
siders the latter to be self-employed whilst in other matters, such as tax laws and 
sick leave, the self-employed are defined as employees (Jørgensen and De Paz, 
2011). In addition, with respect to the self-employed without employees, a grey-
zone group exists. They are often termed ‘the third group’ in the labour market 
because in one way or another, they are economically dependent workers. They 
include, inter alia, freelancers and the bogus self-employed. These workers are 
not engaged in a traditional employee-employer relation, but at the same time, 
they are not typically self-employed, mainly because they receive most or all of 
their income from one client. However, they are not eligible for some social 
benefits due to their status as self-employed (Ballebye et al., 2009). It is this 
group that is at greater risk of becoming precarious, as they often have limited 
or no rights to social benefits and no guaranteed income due to their status as 
self-employed. Self-employed without employees – the group facing a greater 
risk of becoming precarious – account for 60 percent of all self-employed and 
their numbers have increased in recent years, despite the number of Danish self-
employed, generally speaking, remaining relatively stable during the last decade 
(Eurostat, 2014b). 
Flexi-jobs
1
 are a government-funded wage-subsidy job scheme that is part of 
the government’s active labour market policies. There are several other wage-
subsidy job schemes in Denmark, but we have chosen to focus on the flexi-job 
scheme as flexi-jobs, in contrast to other wage-subsidy job schemes, typically 
entail a permanent position. Flexi-jobs are open-ended positions and can there-
fore be considered ‘real jobs’. The scheme was introduced in 1998 to reduce the 
rising number of people on incapacity benefits and is administrated by local 
government authorities. Flexi-jobs are eligible to all disabled people who meet 
specific visitation criteria. Their work tasks and working hours are organised 
around their own capabilities (Mailand and Larsen, 2011). Whilst employees in 
flexi-jobs previously received wage compensation equivalent to employees in 
comparable full-time jobs, despite working reduced hours, recent rule changes 
that came into force in 2013 have altered this practice, and people in flexi-jobs 
now receive salary only for the hours they work. Therefore, some people in 
flexi-jobs may face a greater risk of precariousness, depending on similar crite-
ria as those listed for fixed-term contracts and part-time work. In 2013, 2.4 per-
cent of the Danish workforce held a flexi-job (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen, 2014). 
                                                     
1 Flexi-jobs are considered to be part of the active labour market policy in Denmark. Among the various active 
labour market policy measures, we have chosen to include only flexi-jobs, most importantly because they, in 
contrast to, for instance, job training measures (subsidized jobs), are permanent positions. 
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As can be seen in figure 2.1, some employment forms have increased in re-
cent years. TAW, flexi-jobs and part-time jobs, including marginal part-time 
work, have become more common in the Danish labour market since 2000. For 
example, TAW increased rapidly until it peaked in 2008 but was nearly halved 
in 2009 due to the economic crisis and has since then slowly increased, alt-
hough numbers remain comparatively higher than at the beginning of the Mil-
lennium. Likewise, the number of flexi-jobs has increased significantly since 
the introduction of the scheme in 1998. The increasing popularity of the flexi-
job scheme up until 2013, not only with employers but also with disabled peo-
ple and local government authorities, may be due to economic incentives, as the 
scheme is heavily subsidized by the central government (Bredgaard et al., 2009; 
Gupta and Larsen, 2008). In addition, the numbers for part-time workers also 
remain comparatively higher than in 2000, but a slight decline – except for 
marginal part-time work – can be traced since 2011. Other forms of non-
standard employment, such as fixed-term contracts and self-employment, have 
remained relatively stable or may even have declined during the last decade 
(Eurostat, 2014b; 2014e). 
Compared with their peers in permanent full-time positions, some employees 
holding one of the aforementioned employment contracts seem to face a greater 
risk of unemployment, low pay, restricted access to social security benefits (in-
cluding unemployment insurance, paid maternity, paternity and parental leave 
and occupational pensions), restricted access to private health care insurance 
schemes, restricted access to further training and limited opportunities for career 
advancement. Hence, they are somewhat related to a risk of precariousness de-
spite being covered, in principle, by the labour law and/or collective agreements 
to the same extent as comparable employees on full-time open-ended contracts. 
This is the case for employees with few working hours,fixed-term contracts, 
some types of self-employed and some groups of temps, and to a lesser extent, 
flexi-jobbers (Mailand and Larsen, 2011; Scheuer, 2011a). 
Looking across the Danish labour market, some types of employment are 
more widespread in some sectors than others. For example, flexi-jobs and fixed-
term contracts are more frequently found in the public than in the private sector 
(DA, 2013a; Thomsen et al., 2011). Likewise, part-time work is also common in 
the public sector along with the private services, transport and retail sectors, 
where more than one in three employees work part-time (DA, 2013a). In addi-
tion, various forms of atypical work are also relatively common in the construc-
tion sector, though less so in the manufacturing sector (Scheuer, 2011a: table 
5.2). These differences across sectors also appear to affect the social partners’ 
approaches to atypical work.  
 
2.2 Social partners’ general approach to different employment types 
The Danish labour market is regulated primarily through collective agreements 
signed by the social partners at the sectoral and company levels. Union density 
– 69 percent in 2014 – and the collective agreement coverage rate – 84 percent 
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in 2012 – are comparatively high, and the industrial relations system is domi-
nated by a high degree of voluntarism, where trade unions and employers find 
solutions to various challenges through collective agreements (Ibsen et al., 
2014; DA, 2014a). The social partners are also involved, on an ad hoc basis, in 
the policy formulation process when the government proposes new legislation. 
Moreover, they are involved in policy implementation in several policy areas.  
Although the regulation of wages and working conditions is left primarily to 
social partners, legislation dominates in areas such as vacation regulation, 
health and safety, vocational education and training and active labour market 
policy. Wages and working conditions of salaried employees also are regulated 
by law – the Salaried Employees Act (2009) – and legislation is also used when 
implementing the EU’s labour market directives.  
With regard to the industrial relations system, the parties have the right to 
engage in industrial actions only when a collective agreement is negotiated 
and/or reviewed at the bargaining rounds which take place every two or three 
years (depending on the sector). During the settlement period, there is no resort 
to industrial action – the so-called peace obligation – even if company-based 
bargaining typically takes place after the peace obligation has come into force 
(Due and Madsen, 2008). 
It is within this framework that Danish social partners guard, represent and 
negotiate wages and working conditions of different employment groups at the 
sectoral and company levels. In recent years, atypical workers have, to varying 
degrees, been on the agenda of social partners during the collective bargaining 
rounds in the private and public sector. Trade unions and employers’ associa-
tions have different traditions dealing with the issue of atypical work and have 
adopted distinct strategies depending on the sector under consideration (see the 
chapters on hospital, industrial cleaning, construction and the TAW sector).  
Generally speaking, the issue of atypical workers has not been given high 
priority by Danish social partners – at least not until very recently. Their atti-
tude towards atypical work varies not only between social partners but also 
internally among the trade unions and employers’ associations. The attitude 
seems to depend on the sector and the type of atypical work under consideration 
(Mailand and Larsen, 2011). For example, within some sectors, part-time work 
was banned until the implementation of the EU’s directive on part-time work in 
2001, whilst in other sectors, such as industrial cleaning, social partners already 
had a number of rules and regulations in place to protect the wages and working 
conditions of part-time workers (Andersen, 2003). Likewise, some sectoral 
agreements, such as those covering the construction sector, parts of the private 
services sector and the local government sector, already had regulations in place 
regarding the renewal of fixed-term contracts before the implementation of the 
EU’s directive on fixed-term work, whilst this was not the case in other sectors 
(Andersen, 2003; Larsen, 2009). Also, with respect to TAW, do some sectors 
have longer traditions of regulating the wages and working conditions of temps 
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than others and had thereby addressed the issue long before the EU’s directive 
on temporary agency work (Andersen and Karkov, 2011; see also chapter 3). 
Nevertheless, the EU’s directives on atypical work seem to have pushed up the 
issue of atypical work on the bargaining agenda of social partners, and it is 
questionable whether some sectors would have signed collective agreements for 
some employment groups, such as salaried employees working as temps, with-
out the EU directives lurking in the background. 
Trade union strategies 
Danish trade unions have had difficulties in deciding how to address several of 
the employment types that are described as atypical and precarious work in the 
present project. Ignoring the differences between the various unions and focus-
ing on their positions on atypical and precarious work in general, it would be 
fair to describe these as having developed during the last two decades from 
trying to reduce such types of employment towards trying to improve their pay 
and conditions. However, this development is not seen to the same extent with 
regard to all types of precarious employment. Moreover, when it comes to some 
types of employment, the two strategies coexist (Mailand and Larsen, 2011; 
Andersen, 2003).  
Apart from this, it is difficult to draw a general picture of the Danish trade 
unions’ policies on precarious work. For example, LO – the largest trade union 
confederation – had no general overarching strategy on atypical employment 
prior to 2011. However, in September 2011, LO decided on a new strategy, by 
which it promotes the rights of atypical employees when new legislation is 
adopted or existing legislation revised. LO also decided to work on changing 
seniority rules and regulations in so far as legislation excludes certain groups of 
atypical workers (Mailand and Larsen, 2011). Another sign that atypical em-
ployees are of increasing priority within LO is its recent study from 2010–2011 
(the Scheuer 2011b publication), which includes a large-scale ‘mapping’ of 
atypical employees and their wages and working conditions.  
Employer strategies  
Employer strategies towards atypical or precarious work have been different 
from those of the unions. Ignoring the differences between the various employ-
ers’ associations and concentrating on the more general positions on atypical 
work, employers have, generally speaking, embraced flexible working. They 
have also tried to relax the rules and regulations in order to increase flexibility, 
but at the same time, they have also agreed to improve and ensure the wages 
and working conditions of atypical workers during the collective bargaining 
rounds (Andersen, 2003; see chapters on industrial cleaning, hospitals, con-
struction and TAW). Their initiatives to prevent social dumping and unfair 
competition and to ensure reasonable wages and working conditions for differ-
ent groups of employees through the set-up of certification schemes in distinct 
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sectors also indicate that precarious work is of increasing priority for Danish 
employers. However, they refrain from using the terms ‘precarious’ and ‘atypi-
cal’ work. 
Focusing on the largest employers’ association, DA, its general view is that 
there is no need to limit the use of TAW, fixed-term work or part-time work or 
to introduce specific rules and regulations to protect these groups, according to 
its most recent report (DA, 2013a). In the report – which can be considered a 
counter-analysis to the study on atypical work by LO and Scheuer (2011b) – 
DA also stresses that the employment types that coexist alongside the traditional 
full-time open-ended contract meet some important needs of employers and that 
limiting them would affect negatively companies’ flexibility, employees’ em-
ployability and the Danish economy more generally (DA, 2013a). DA is also 
critical of using the two concepts ‘atypical’ and ‘precarious’ work in the Danish 
context, as it argues that this group of employees is highly diverse and performs 
different job tasks and functions on the labour market but is nevertheless cov-
ered in principle by the same rules and regulations as comparable employees on 
full-time open-ended contracts (DA, 2013a: 5).  
 
 
2.3 Summing up 
The Danish labour market is characterised by different employment types that 
coexist alongside the traditional full-time open-ended contract. Whilst some 
employment types, such as part-time work and TAW, have become more com-
mon in recent years, others, such as fixed-term contracts and self-employment, 
have remained relatively stable. Variations exist across the labour market as to 
which sectors employ these groups of employees. Part-time work, fixed-term 
contracts and flexi-jobs are more frequently found in the public than in the pri-
vate sector. However, in the private sector, we also find sectors, such as con-
struction, transport and private services, where the workforce is increasingly 
diverse in terms of employment types, but only some groups can be considered 
precarious workers in terms of low wages and low levels of social, employment 
and job security. 
Social partners have developed responses to ensure the wages and working 
conditions of employees with different employment contracts. However, wide 
variations exist depending on the employment type and sector under considera-
tion. Indeed, the main social partner organisations on both sides of industry 
have only recently addressed the issue of atypical or precarious work but have 
refrained from using these terms, and no consensus exists as to which groups of 
employees can be considered precarious. 
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3. Temporary agency work 
 
3.1 Introduction to the sector 
Temporary agency work (TAW) became more common in the Danish labour 
market in the period leading up to the most recent economic crisis. Up until 
1990, legislation restricted the use of TAW by private entities as the public job 
centres had a legal monopoly on facilitating employment services. However, in 
1990 new legislation liberalised the sector, allowing private companies to pro-
vide such services (Kudsk-Iversen and Andersen, 2006). After that, the TAW 
sector grew rapidly in terms of the companies’ economic turnover and the num-
ber of agencies and their workers, until it peaked in 2008. In 2009, the sector 
was hit relatively hard by the economic crisis, when the number of temps nearly 
halved, 13 percent of private temporary work agencies (TWAs) went bankrupt 
and the annual economic turnover was reduced by 36 percent within just one 
year (CIETT, 2014; DI, 2014a: 4-9). Since then, the sector has slowly recovered 
though numbers remain comparatively higher than in the beginning of the mil-
lennium (see table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1: Development in the TAW sector, percentages and  numbers. 2000–14 
 2000 2008 2009 2012 
Number of temporary work agencies 486 1,216 1,078 1,009 
Number of temps as a percentage of 
the Danish workforce 
0.3 1.1 0.6 0.8 
Economic turnover (in millions- euros) 476 1.844 1.355 1.364 
Source: DI (2014a); CIETT (2014); Vilhelmsen (2014); Statistics Denmark (2014d). 
 
The TAW sector is dominated by small companies and relatively few large 
players. Recent figures reveal that 6 percent of the agencies have more than 100 
employees, whilst 70 percent have fewer than 10 employees (DI, 2014a). They 
employ around 0.8 percent of the Danish workforce and operate in a number of 
sectors. The manufacturing sector and construction sector employ the largest 
group of temps by far, followed by the health and social care sector, and then 
the transport sector, when comparing the number of TAW hours sold to compa-
nies within different sectors (see figure 3.1).  
TAW being more widely used in the manufacturing sector and construction 
sector than in other parts of the labour market is a relatively recent phenome-
non. Up until 2010, TAW was also regularly used in the health and social care 
sector, where nurses and health and social care workers in particular often took 
a temp job alongside their regular job (see chapter 4). Since then, the use of 
TAW in the health and social care sector has declined rapidly due to financial 
cutbacks and the set-up of internal TWAs within the health and social care units 
(see also chapter 4). In addition, TAW within other office work has nearly 
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halved since 2007, whilst this form of employment has become more common 
in sectors like transport and particularly other categories of personnel.  
This shift in terms of the use of TAW within different sectors has also af-
fected the gender composition of temps. Whilst the majority were women in 
2008, there are now more men than women within the TAW sector, mainly 
because more men have taken up agency work, whilst the number of women 
has remained relatively unchanged since 2010 (Vilhelmsen, 2014). Other char-
acteristics of temps are that they typically are young people between 18 and 29 
years old, and nearly one in three has no educational attainment. However, the 
employees within the TAW sector are getting older, with recent figures reveal-
ing that 26 percent are more than 50 years old compared to 19 percent in 2003 
(DI, 2014a: 12). Temps are also more likely to have earned a degree compared 
to just a decade ago, when one in two had no educational credentials (DI, 
2014a: 14). This is reportedly due to the economic crisis and the recent changes 
in the rules and regulations of the Danish unemployment insurance scheme. As 
a result, an increasing number of skilled workers who previously held a perma-
nent position have opted for TAW to ensure an income after being dismissed, 
according to the interviewees. 
 
Figure 3.1: Number of TAW hours sold to companies, percentage, 07–2012 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Denmark (2014e). 
Collective agreement coverage rate 
In Denmark, the TAW sector is regulated through a combination of legislation 
and collective agreements; employees without collective agreement coverage 
are covered by labour law following the implementation of the EU’s directive 
on TAW in 2013. Covering TAW in Denmark is a complex web of different 
collective agreements signed at the sectoral and company levels. In some sec-
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tors, such as manufacturing, TAW is covered by the collective agreements of 
the user company. In other parts of the private sector, TAW is covered by dis-
tinct sectoral and company agreements between the social partners representing 
the TWA and the temps according to their specific occupation (Mailand and 
Larsen, 2011; Jørgensen, 2007). Therefore, temps within nursing are covered by 
their own collective agreements on TAW. The same applies to temps in the 
transportation and the educational sectors. Yet in other sectors a different ap-
proach is used, where the temps’ wages and working hours follow the collective 
agreement of the user company, whilst other working conditions such as pen-
sions, further training are regulated by the collective agreement of the agency. 
This complex web of collective agreements covers most temps in the Danish 
labour market.  
In a recent study, Felbo-Kolding and Andersen (2013) estimated that the col-
lective agreement coverage within the TAW sector is 61 percent, slightly lower 
than the general coverage rate for the private sector (74 percent [DA, 2014]). In 
some sectors, particularly the sectors relying most heavily on TAW – such as 
the manufacturing, construction, transport and health and social care sectors – 
collective agreement coverage may be even higher for temps, as these sectors 
are characterised by relatively high collective agreement coverage.  
Employers’ associations 
An estimated 70 percent of TWAs in Denmark are members of an employers’ 
association (Andersen and Felbo-Kolding, 2013b). It is primarily the large 
agencies that are members of an employers’ association, whilst the vast majori-
ty of small and medium-sized agencies are not.  
The main employers’ associations representing TWAs are DI and the Feder-
ation of Staffing Agencies in Denmark (VB). The latter is a member of the em-
ployers’ association Danish Chamber of Commerce. VB has around 100 mem-
bers and covers 60 percent of the sector based on the economic turnover of the 
different agencies.  
Trade unions 
Recent figures on union density among temps are unavailable. However, it has 
been estimated that their union density is comparatively lower than among other 
groups of employees in the Danish labour market (Andersen and Karkov, 2011). 
Young people, employees with low or no educational attainment and migrant 
workers are overrepresented among temps – groups that for various reasons 
typically choose not to be union members (Ibsen et al., 2011; Andersen and 
Karkov, 2011). Unlike the Danish employers’ associations, the interests of 
temps are represented by a large number of unions covering different sectors of 
the labour market. There is no trade union especially for temps.  
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3.2. Wages and conditions for different employment types 
In Denmark, different forms of TAW exist. Part-time work is reportedly wide-
spread within the sector, where some temps have relatively few weekly working 
hours combined with very short-term contracts – often day-to-day contracts. 
Others work full-time and have long-term contracts; examples exist of contracts 
of lasting up to four years. According to the interviewees, the most common 
length of contract is between three and six months. There are, however, no ex-
act figures as to how many temps work part-time or full-time on a short- or 
long-term contract. Nevertheless, this suggests that among temps, variations 
exist as to their wages, employment and working conditions, with some groups 
facing a greater risk of precariousness than others, particularly those with rela-
tively few weekly hours and very short-term contracts. Indeed,  
research has revealed that temps often face great difficulties in accruing rights 
to social benefits, although the labour law and collective agreements in princi-
ple ensure them similar rights as comparable employees in permanent full-time 
positions (Scheuer, 2011a; Andersen and Karkov, 2011; see table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2: Access to social benefits on employment types, in percentages, 2010  
 Temps Full-time employees 
Further training 14 91 
Employee appraisal 18 73 
Extra holiday entitlements 25 92 
Access to an occupational 
pensions scheme 
46 94 
Highly variable working 
hours 
50 29 
Unemployment insurance 75 91 
Source: Scheuer (2011a: table 5.3, 5.5, 5.9, 5.12, 5.18). 
  
In 2010, relatively few temps had access to further training, employee apprais-
als and extra holiday entitlements, whilst nearly all their peers in permanent 
full-time positions had access to such social benefits. Temps’ access to occupa-
tional pensions was also relatively restricted compared to their colleagues in 
full-time positions, whilst most were – similar to their colleagues in full-time 
permanent positions – covered by an unemployment insurance fund. In addi-
tion, their working hours appeared highly variable, with one in two temps fac-
ing such working hours.  
Many temps face difficulties accessing the social benefits listed in table 3.2, 
owing partly to some working in the unorganised labour market. They are there-
fore not covered by collective agreements or eligible for the benefits stipulated 
therein, unless their employer offers such benefits or these benefits are regulat-
ed by labour law. Some social benefits, such as extra holiday entitlements, the 
minimum wage and paid short-term leave, are regulated exclusively through 
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collective agreements, and collective agreements tend to offer more generous 
social security packages than the labour law.  
Many temps’ restricted access to the social benefits listed in the collective 
agreements is also due partly, in some cases, to social partners at the company 
level – including the shop steward – accepting that temps are treated differently 
than their peers in permanent positions. According to a recent study by 3F based 
on answers from 1,063 shop stewards, 28 percent of shop stewards stated that 
temps are not employed on the same terms and conditions as their colleagues in 
permanent positions (CO-industri, 2014). Recent case law and media reports 
have also revealed a number of instances, particularly within the industrial 
cleaning and agricultural sectors, where temps’ wages and working conditions 
were far below Danish standards. Indeed, temps have recently attracted in-
creased attention from the Danish media, and an ongoing debate, which also 
involves groups like manufacturing and office workers employed as temps, 
concerns their de facto wages and working conditions and access to social bene-
fits. However, other studies, such as the recent report by DA, have argued that 
temps in principle are covered by the same rules and regulations as employees 
on full-time open-ended contracts (DA, 2013a). 
Some interviewees also reported of local company agreements where social 
partners, in various creative ways, have tried to restrict temps’ access to, for 
example, wage supplements and other social benefits by making it nearly im-
possible for them to accrue the number of hours or the employment record 
needed to gain access to these benefits. Other examples of ways to cut costs 
reportedly involve temps being dismissed by their current agency and then re-
employed by another agency, which sometimes sends them to the same user 
company.  
Temps often face similar barriers regarding access to the social benefits out-
lined in the labour law and the sectoral collective agreements because they rare-
ly meet the legal assessment criteria, even if recent rule changes have relaxed 
the restrictions (Lorentzen, 2011; see also appendix A). Indeed, they often have 
great difficulties in accruing the number of hours or the employment record 
needed to gain access to social benefits. 
Social benefits 
Temps’ access to social benefits and wage supplements varies significantly 
from one collective agreement to another. The threshold for accruing rights to 
specific social benefits also varies depending on the benefit under consideration. 
Whilst there is no threshold for accruing rights to pensions in the collective 
agreement of the Danish Chamber of Commerce and Fag og Arbejde (FOA), 
this is not the case in the collective agreements of DI and CO-industri, and 3F 
and the Danish Chamber of Commerce, where the threshold for such social 
benefits is a two-month employment record and 320 hours of employment in 
the last two years, respectively (see appendix A). Indeed, some temps are cov-
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ered by agreements that offer lower work standards and conditions compared 
not only to their peers covered by different collective agreements on TAW but 
also to their colleagues in permanent full-time positions in the user company. 
This is the case regarding full pay during maternity leave, sick leave and short-
term leave, which are excluded from some of the collective agreements on 
TAW (see appendix A). As a result, some temps may face greater risks of pre-
cariousness than their peers in permanent full-time positions, as they are unable 
or may find it difficult to accrue rights to different social benefits due to rela-
tively short-term contracts, few weekly hours or the fact that such social bene-
fits are excluded from their collective agreements.  
Job and employment security 
Some collective agreements differentiate between temps paid by the hour and 
those with monthly contracts when it comes to their notice period. For example, 
the notice period of the Salaried Employees Act (2009) applies only to temps 
with monthly contracts in the collective agreement of the Danish Chamber of 
Commerce and FOA. Temps without such a contract can be dismissed without 
any notice. Indeed, this practice is relatively widespread in the TAW sector, 
where the right to a notice period typically requires an employment record of 
one to nine months depending on the collective agreement under consideration. 
This indicates that job and employment security of temps are relatively low, 
particularly if they hold a relatively short-term contract or are recruited on a 
day-to-day basis (see appendix A).  
Wages 
With respect to their wages, some temps receive higher salaries than their peers 
in permanent positions. Indeed, some collective agreements on TAW compen-
sate for the lack of social benefits and job security through higher wages. This 
applies to, for example, the collective agreements of the Danish Chamber of 
Commerce and FOA, and the Danish Chamber of Commerce and BUPL, FOA 
and SL. Research has also revealed that some nurses and social care workers 
have opted for agency jobs due to the higher salaries offered by the TWAs, and 
they typically earn more than their peers in permanent positions (Adecco, 2006; 
Jacobsen and Rasmussen, 2009). Not all temps are so fortunate, and Polish mi-
grant workers in agency jobs in particular often receive a relatively low salary 
compared not only to their Danish peers working as temps and Danish employ-
ees in general but also to other Polish migrant workers (Hansen and Hansen, 
2009; see also chapter 5). The interviewees also reported such practices within 
the TAW sector and gave examples of agencies trying to cut costs by offering 
lower wages and lower levels of social protection to temps than the collective 
agreements stipulate. That a Polish agency operating in the Danish labour mar-
ket promotes itself by offering cheap labour at €6.7 per hour only underlines the 
statements of the interviewees. In addition, a recent study revealed that 37 per-
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cent of TWAs have called for a legislative minimum wage, indicating that so-
cial dumping takes place in the sector to some degree (Andersen and Felbo-
Kolding, 2013b). TWAs can compete on wages and social costs despite the 
principle of non-discrimination within the EU’s directive on TAW because the 
concept of social costs is unclear in the legislation and collective agreements, 
according to the interviewees. The social costs are the payment the user compa-
ny pays the agency when using TAW.  
Voice  
Temps are less likely to be union members, to be covered by a collective 
agreement, and to work in companies where a shop steward is present at the 
workplace (Scheuer, 2011a). They also experience, to varying degrees, that the 
shop stewards and their colleagues in full-time positions ignore and exclude 
them from the workers’ community at the workplace, as they are reportedly 
considered a threat by the permanent staff. 
In sum, temps appear to be at greater risk of precariousness, based on pa-
rameters such as wages, social benefits, and working time and job and employ-
ment security. It is mainly temps in full-time employment on long-term con-
tracts that are ensured a reasonable income and access to social benefits rela-
tively similar to their peers in permanent positions. However, they are at greater 
risk of being dismissed during periods of economic cutbacks, and their voice is 
often ignored at the company level.  
 
3.3 Social partners’ approach to atypical work in the sector
2 
The strategies used by employers’ associations and particularly trade unions 
have shifted in recent years. Danish trade unions tried to minimize or even 
avoid TAW up until the mid-1990s. Since then the unions have accepted TAW 
as an employment form in the Danish labour market and have pushed for new 
rules and regulations to ensure reasonable wages and working conditions for 
temps (Andersen and Karkov, 2011). However, some Danish unions continue to 
be rather reluctant to embrace TAW and have called for various measures to 
reduce its use, according to the interviewees. The employers’ associations have 
also been willing to develop initiatives to respond to the challenges facing the 
TAW sector. Some responses have been developed jointly by the unions and the 
employers’ associations through collective agreements. Others have been union 
led or employer led, and yet another set of initiatives has, for various reasons, 
been unsuccessful.  
The main changes include (1) raising collective bargaining coverage and un-
ion density, (2) lowering the thresholds for accruing rights to social benefits, 
improving the social benefits and adding new social rights, (3) developing new 
rules and regulations for TWAs and subcontractors to prevent social dumping 
and unfair competition and (4) implementing the EU’s directive on TAW.  
                                                     
2 This section draws on the work by Andersen and Karkov (2011), Mailand and Larsen (forthcoming),  
Andersen and Ibsen (2014) and Kudsk-Iversen and Andersen (2006).  
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Raising the collective agreement coverage and union density
3
 
In Denmark, TAW is regulated through a mix of legislation and collective 
agreements signed at the sectoral and company levels, as mentioned earlier. The 
nature of the collective agreements varies depending on the sector under con-
sideration, largely owing to different strategies employed by the social partners, 
trade unions in particular.  
Within the manufacturing sector, the trade unions advocated in the 1990s for 
a strategy to cover TAW through the user company. A protocol on TAW was 
included in the existing sectoral agreement of DI and CO-industri in 1995. They 
opted for this strategy owing partly to the dense network of shop stewards and 
strong tradition of local company-based bargaining, which could be used to 
ensure the de facto coverage of temps. Another driving force behind this strate-
gy was the trade unions estimating that it would be difficult to organise the 
agencies without the presence of shop stewards at the workplaces (Mailand and 
Larsen, 2011; Kudsk-Iversen and Andersen, 2006). The employers’ interest in 
covering TAW through collective agreements was to avoid unfair competition. 
Indeed, regulating TAW has been dominated by a common consensus by social 
partners within the manufacturing sector, although not on all aspects (see Mai-
land and Larsen, forthcoming). This applies to, for example, the regulation of 
salaried workers working as temps within the manufacturing sector. Here the 
unions unsuccessfully pushed to get the issue on the bargaining agenda during 
the collective bargaining rounds in 1998, 2000, 2004 and 2007.  
In 2010 CO-industri and its counterpart, DI, first engaged in negotiations 
with the aim of signing an agreement regarding salaried employees working as 
temps during the collective period of 2010. The employers’ willingness to dis-
cuss the issue was due mainly to EU’s directive on TAW (Kragh, 2013). In 
2011, DI and CO-industri agreed to implement the EU’s directive on TAW 
covering only blue-collar and hourly workers, but in 2012 they added another 
protocol stating that they will continue their discussions regarding salaried em-
ployees working as temps after the government’s implementation of the EU’s 
directive through legislation (CO-industri and DI, 2012b). This addition was 
reportedly due to various uncertainties and discussions regarding the status of 
salaried employees when working as temps and whether such employees were 
entitled to similar rights as salaried employees covered by the Salaried Employ-
ees Act (2009) following the implementation of the EU’s directive. In 2013, the 
social partners agreed that salaried employees working for a TWA that is a 
member of DI are covered by DI and CO-industri’s collective agreement on 
salaried employees within the manufacturing sector (Kragh, 2013). In case the 
agency is not a member of DI, the salaried employee working as a temp is cov-
ered not by the collective agreement but only by the labour law. Indeed, this 
issue continues to be unsettled, as the social partners were unable to reach an 
                                                     
3 This section draws heavily on the work by Andersen and Karkov (2011), Mailand and Larsen (2011) and 
Kudsk-Iversen and Andersen (2006).  
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agreement for this group of temps, mainly because the employers’ price for 
such an agreement was considered too high by the unions, according to the in-
terviewees.  
In the construction sector, the social partners included a protocol on TAW in 
the sectoral agreement covering the user company. The unions pushed for this 
strategy mainly because an increasing number of construction companies had 
started to use TAW as a way to cut costs by avoiding the rules and regulations 
in the existing collective agreements. The employers’ association Dansk  
Byggeri agreed to add a protocol on TAW to the existing collective agreements 
within the construction sector. The protocol stipulates that TAW is covered by 
the existing collective agreements and that such employees have the same rights 
as other construction workers even if the agency is not a member of Dansk  
Byggeri. In case the agency is member of another employers’ associations that 
is part of DA, the collective agreement of the agency will apply (Andersen and 
Karkov, 2011).  
To cover TAW through collective agreements, social partners agreed to a 
different strategy in transportation and the private services sectors. Here the 
unions advocated for collective agreements either directly with the agencies or 
with their employers’ association, mainly because the network of shop stewards 
is relatively weak in these sectors and thus it would be difficult to ensure the 
wages and working conditions of temps (Andersen and Karkov, 2011). That 
some unions, particularly 3F, also saw this strategy as an opportunity to recruit 
new members among the staff of individual agencies was reportedly also an 
important driver for them to sign collective agreements directly with the agency 
or its employers’ association within the transport sector (Mailand and Larsen, 
forthcoming). In the private services sector, TAW concerning office work and 
administration has been included in the collective agreement between the trade 
union HK and the employers’ association Dansk Handel and Service (DHS) – 
now part of the Danish Chamber of Commerce (Dansk Erhverv) – since 1992 
(Kudsk-Iversen and Andersen, 2006). This collective agreement covers retail, 
office and storage workers and was a direct result of a legal case put forward by 
HK in 1992 (Lundbye, 2013).  
In other sectors, social partners have also concluded collective agreements 
on TAW or amended clauses or protocols to their existing agreements to ensure 
the wages and working conditions of  temps. As a result, Danish trade unions 
and employers have managed to increase the collective agreement coverage for 
temps in Denmark. Besides the collective agreements, trade unions and em-
ployers’ associations have also initiated individual responses to increase union 
density and TWA membership in employers’ association.  
New rights and lower thresholds – the manufacturing sector 
Temps have often great difficulties in accessing the social benefits within the 
collective agreements, as mentioned earlier. In recent years, social partners have 
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lowered the threshold for accruing rights to social benefits within the collective 
agreements to ensure that temps can more easily gain access to them. The chap-
ters regarding atypical work in the hospital, construction and cleaning sectors 
examine the rights of temps in these sectors. Therefore, this section will concen-
trate mainly on the recent initiatives by social partners in the manufacturing 
sector as TAW is relatively widely used in this sector, and the collective agree-
ment by DI and CO-industri is, in many ways, the leading collective agreement 
for the Danish labour market, and social partners in other sectors often adopt 
and incorporate the changes agreed on here. 
In the manufacturing sector, the main changes on TAW took place during 
the collective bargaining rounds in 1995, 2000, 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2014. In 
1995, the social partners agreed to include a specific protocol on TAW in their 
existing collective agreements covering manual workers/hourly workers. The 
protocol stipulates that temps are covered by the same collective agreement that 
applies to employees of the user company if the company is an affiliate of DI. 
Temps covered by the agreement are also able to accrue rights to the social ben-
efits within the collective agreement if they, similar to the employees of the user 
company, meet the assessment criteria. Since then, social partners have agreed 
to add new clauses to the protocol and to ease temps’ access to the social bene-
fits outlined in the collective agreements by lowering the threshold to accrue 
rights and by granting employees new social rights.  
During the collective bargaining round in 2007, social partners agreed to add 
a new clause to the protocol on TAW that specifies that if the TWA is an affili-
ate of DI, legal action will be taken against it if for example the TWA violates 
the collective agreements. In case the TWA is not an affiliate of DI, legal ac-
tions will be targeted at the user company. They also agreed to a clause enabling 
temps to transfer accrued rights to social benefits from the TWA to the user 
company if the temp is employed by the user company and his or her employ-
ment record with the TWA exceeds six months (Mailand and Larsen, forthcom-
ing; CO-industri and DI, 2004; 2007). In addition, during the collective bargain-
ing round in 2007, temps’ ability to accrue social rights was clarified in the 
protocol to cover all the entitlements listed in the collective agreement that re-
quire an employment record, if their TWA is a member of DI and the temp has 
no break between jobs of more than six months (CO-industri and DI, 2007: 
213). Prior to 2007, the collective agreement specified only that temps, among 
others, were able to accrue rights to a notice period and paid sick leave. Howev-
er, the length of a break between jobs before losing any accrued rights was re-
duced from nine to six months in 2007 (CO-industri and DI, 2007: 213).  
Further additions to the protocol were added in 2014, when social partners 
agreed to extend the threshold for temps to transfer accrued rights from six to 
nine months. They also added a new clause which enables shop stewards of the 
user company to request information on the local agreements and customs given 
by the user company to the TWA when temps are used for specific jobs at the 
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user company (CO-industri and DI, 2014). In case the shop steward disagrees as 
to which local company agreements and customs of the user company the TWA 
will have to follow, legal actions can be initiated against the user company or 
the TWA depending on the status of the TWA regarding membership of DI 
(CO-industri and DI, 2014). These changes were reportedly due to union mem-
bers and shop stewards calling for action owing to the rising numbers of temps 
and their fear that TAW increasingly would replace permanent positions in the 
manufacturing sector (Andersen and Ibsen, 2013; 2014; Interview: CO-industri, 
2014). Following this discussion, DI and CO-industri also agreed to grant social 
partners at the company level a new possibility for assistance from social part-
ners at central level to discuss the various options for increased flexibility with-
in the collective agreements. This included, for example, the use of TAW, vari-
able working hours and the possibilities for local agreements to deviate from the 
sectoral agreement (CO-industri and DI, 2014).  
In recent years, social partners have also agreed to other changes in the col-
lective agreements which affect the wages and working conditions of temps but 
do not exclusively target this group of employees. For example, the pension 
contribution rates were increased repeatedly during the collective bargaining 
rounds in 2000, 2004, 2007 and 2010 and in 2014 accounted for 12.0 percent of 
the salary, compared to 4.4 percent in 1998. In addition, in 2010 the threshold 
for pension contributions was lowered from nine to two months, which, accord-
ing to the interviewee from CO-industri, was primarily to ensure that temps also 
would be covered by such schemes.  
The right to full-paid sick leave has also been subject to change in recent 
years. In 2000, social partners agreed to extend the number of weeks with full 
pay from four to five weeks, and in 2012, the threshold to accrue rights to full-
paid sick leave was reduced from nine to six months, which will ease, among 
others’, temps’ access to such benefits (CO-industri and DI, 2000; 2012). Rights 
and access to further training have also been up for negotiation by social part-
ners, most recently during the bargaining round in 2014, when the threshold 
regarding access to further training was lowered from nine to six months. In 
2014, social partners also agreed to grant employees the right to one week of 
further training and the right to time off to seek guidance from unions if dis-
missed and if they hold an employment record of six months(CO-industri and 
DI, 2014). 
Rights to full-paid maternity, paternity and parental leave and to short-term 
leave if an employee’s child is hospitalised or ill have also been on the agenda 
of social partners in recent years. In 2000, social partners agreed to remove the 
upper threshold for wage compensation during maternity and paternity leave, 
whereby full pay applies to all employees meeting the legal criteria. In 2004, six 
weeks’ full-paid parental leave was introduced, along with new rights to full-
paid time off if an employee’s child is hospitalised or ill. The length of paid 
parental leave was further extended to nine weeks in 2007, 11 weeks in 2010 
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and 13 weeks in 2014. However, the threshold to access paid parental leave has 
remained unchanged and continues to be nine months – making it difficult for 
temps to accrue rights to these social benefits.  
In sum, social partners have jointly developed a range of initiatives to ensure 
the wages and working conditions of temps in the manufacturing sector – re-
sponses that often have been initiated by the unions and then negotiated with 
and agreed to by the employers. However, some union initiatives have also 
failed repeatedly such as the attempt to cover through collective agreement 
temps performing work tasks as salaried employees, on the same grounds as 
other types of temps, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, salaried employees work-
ing as temps have no possibility to transfer accrued rights to social benefits (DI, 
2014b). In addition, some unions also proposed limiting the use of TAW by 
introducing specific quotas in 2014 – a proposal that never was brought to the 
negotiation table with the employers as the unions decided to deal with this 
internally, according to the interviewees.  
Certification schemes for TWAs – an employer-led initiative  
One of the main challenges facing the TAW sector has been stories and cases of 
social dumping and unfair competition, with some agencies offering wages and 
social protection far below Danish standards to their employees, as mentioned 
earlier. Besides the joint actions developed by social partners through the col-
lective bargaining rounds, the Federation of Staffing Agencies in Denmark 
(VB) and DI’s Vikarbranchen have also initiated their own responses to these 
challenges.  
In 2011, VB set up a certification scheme which aims to ensure user compa-
nies and the employees of the TWAs that certified TWAs comply with legisla-
tion and the employers’ obligations which the TWA has undertaken. The 
scheme is compulsory for all VB’s members and includes rules and regulations 
regardingcompliance with collective agreements on TAW. The certificate is 
renewed on an annual basis, and certified TWAs are subject to random reviews 
by an independent authority. TWAs that fail to comply are subject to exclusion.  
Vikarbranchen in DI has developed a similar scheme (‘godkendelses-
ordningen’), which reportedly was highly inspired by the certification scheme 
developed by the Danish Chamber of Commerce and follows the same princi-
ples as the certification scheme by VB. So far one TWA has been expelled be-
cause it employed foreign employees and offered them wages far below the 
standards outlined in the collective agreements (DI, 2014d). The unions have 
reportedly supported and welcomed the schemes because they raise awareness 
and ensure reasonable wages and working conditions for temps.  
The new law on TAW – implementing the EU’s directive 
In 2013, the Danish Parliament passed the Act on TAW aimed at covering 
temps without collective agreement coverage. The act implements the EU’s 
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directive on TAW and guarantees that temps have rights to similar wages and 
working conditions as the employees of the user company. The act also stipu-
lates that the principle of non-discrimination can be exempted only by collective 
agreements signed by the most representative social partner organisations in 
Denmark. This clause was included to avoid social dumping and protect temps. 
It prevents foreign TWAs from using their own national collective agreements 
to offer lower wages and social benefits to their temps (Ministry of Employ-
ment, 2013). 
Prior to the new legislation, the implementation process of the directive was 
long-winded and slightly different from the implementation of former EU direc-
tives. In the past, when EU directives have been implemented through a mix of 
legislation and collective agreements in Denmark, social partners have first 
negotiated and implemented the directive, and then the government, together 
with the social partners, has agreed to supplementary legislation that covers 
employees without collective agreement coverage (Andersen, 2003). This was 
not the case with the directive on TAW; most unions and employers’ associa-
tions awaited the forthcoming law before implementing the directive through 
collective agreement. The main reason was that they were unsure and disagreed 
on how to interpret the directive’s principle of non-discrimination, particularly 
regarding the status of salaried employees working as temps, as mentioned ear-
lier (Andersen and Karkov, 2011). Another controversial issue was how social 
partners and the government could prevent an increase in social dumping. The 
unions in particular feared that foreign TWAs without collective agreement 
coverage would be able to employ temps from their home country and pay them 
a salary and social benefits far below Danish standards (Andersen and Karkov, 
2011; Ministry of Employment, 2013). 
The policy process behind the Danish law on TAW took place within the 
Implementation Committee in 2011, where representatives from government 
and social partners were present. Some participants on the committee described 
the policy process as highly politicised. The clause that allowed exemptions 
from the directive in particular was highly controversial. The employers’ asso-
ciations saw this as an opportunity to limit the effects of the directive, which the 
unions opposed and tried to prevent. The unions also feared that the possibility 
for exemptions would lead to social dumping, as mentioned earlier (Mailand 
and Larsen, forthcoming). The compromise was to include a clause in the act 
which stipulates that the principle of non-discrimination can be exempted only 
insofar as the collective agreements are signed by the most representative social 
partners in the particular sector in the Danish labour market. However, the un-
ions were not pleased with the result, although they signed the agreement, main-
ly because they would be bound to some sectoral agreements on TAW that were 
rather old and did not de facto secure non-discrimination. The trade union inter-
viewees in the present project also felt that the result of the implementation in 
Denmark watered down the directive to some extent.  
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In sum, the implementation of the EU’s directive on TAW has ensured also 
temps without collective agreement coverage. The EU’s directive may also have 
pushed up TAW on the agenda of social partners. Indeed, it is questionable 
whether CO-industri and DI would have agreed to include salaried workers 
employed at user companies in their collective agreement without the directive 
lurking in the background.  
 
 
3.4 Summing up  
In Denmark, TAW is a fairly recent employment type and represents a relative-
ly small segment of the Danish labour market, cutting across various sectors and 
occupations. Although social partners have launched a series of initiatives to 
strengthen the collective agreement coverage of TAW and ensure these work-
ers’ wages and working conditions through collective agreements and legisla-
tion, these employees continue to be at greater risk of precariousness than their 
peers in full-time permanent positions when examining parameters such as 
wages, social benefits, working time and job and employment security. Temps 
with short-term contracts and/or few weekly hours face in particular a greater 
risk of precariousness. They are rarely able to meet the assessment criteria for 
social benefits outlined in the labour law and collective agreements, which in 
many cases, in principle, ensure them similar rights as comparable employees in 
full-time permanent positions. Likewise, similar to temps with long-term full-
time contracts, they are at greater risk of being of dismissed during periods of 
economic cutbacks, and their voice is often ignored at the company level.  
TAW has been high on the agenda of social partners and the government in 
recent years, and at the time of writing, a debate is ongoing in the media and 
among social partners regarding the wages and working conditions of TAW. 
The employers’ associations and unions have jointly and individually developed 
a series of initiatives to improve the wages and working conditions of temps. 
They include (1) raising collective bargaining coverage and union density, (2) 
lowering the threshold for accruing rights to social benefits, (3) developing new 
regulations for TWAs to prevent social dumping and unfair competition and (4) 
implementing the EU’s directive on TAW.  
A complex web of collective agreements exist in which temps are covered 
by the collective agreements of the user company in some sectors, whilst in 
others they are covered by collective agreements signed by the social partners 
representing the TWA and the temps within a specific occupation. In yet other 
sectors, temps are covered only by legislation as social partners have been una-
ble to come to an agreement. This applies to, for example, temps performing job 
tasks as salaried employees. It is primarily the implementation of the EU’s di-
rective on TAW that de jure has ensured wages and working conditions for 
TAW without collective agreement coverage equal to other employees. Howev-
er, the directive may also have pushed up TAW on the agenda of social part-
ners. Indeed, it is questionable whether CO-industri and DI would have agreed 
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to include salaried workers employed at user companies in their collective 
agreement without the directive lurking in the background. 
Although many initiatives by social partners have been developed jointly, 
the responses have often been initiated by the unions and then negotiated with 
and agreed to by the employers. However, the employers have also launched 
initiatives to prevent social dumping and unfair competition and improve wages 
and working conditions within the sector. These include, for example, certifica-
tion schemes, which the unions often have welcomed but have not been part of. 
Indeed, these initiatives are purely employer driven.  
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4. Hospitals  
 
4.1 Introduction to the sector  
The five regions – the tier between the state and the municipalities in the struc-
ture of the public sector – have operational responsibility for the public hospi-
tals in Denmark, whilst overall responsibility remains with the National Health 
Authority (Sundhedsministeriet), which is part of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and the Interior. There are 53 public hospitals. They employ a staff of 
107,000, divided into:  
 
 14 percent doctors,  
 33 percent nurses, 
 10 percent nurse assistants,  
 12 percent other health care staff and 
 30 percent support staff, including administrative staff, psychologists, 
cleaning staff, technical staff etc. (regioner.dk).  
 
Besides the public hospitals, there exist some 30 private hospitals and clinics. 
The number of employees here is unknown, but the units are much smaller than 
in the public sector. The number of employees  and the turnover of the private 
hospitals increased up until 2010 but have since declined as an effect of the 
crisis and a change of political priorities, when the government changed from 
liberal-conservative to centre left in 2011. This development includes both a 
decline in the extent to which private hospitals are used as subcontractors for 
public hospitals and a reduction in the prices paid to subcontractors providing 
health care services. However, in this report the focus will be on hospitals in the 
public sector. 
The municipalities also have responsibility for a number of functions within 
the health care sector. Employees working in health care within the local gov-
ernment sector often have the same occupations as employees in the regional 
sectors. However, since the focus in the present project is hospitals (which is 
part of the regional health care sector), the part of the health care sector admin-
istrated by the municipalities will be touched upon only briefly.  
The social partners in the hospital sector and the collective agreements 
In the hospitals, the employers’ interests are represented by Danish Regions 
(Danske Regioner), including the Region’s Board for Wages and Tariffs (RLTN 
at the national level). Danish Regions is the only employers’ organisation for 
the hospitals. Danish Regions/RLNN is the bargaining partner in the bi- or tri-
annual collective bargaining rounds.  
There are two other levels of employers’ organisations worth mentioning. 
One is the administrative level of the regions (five in all). The hospitals are the 
only major responsibility left for the regions. There are councils for employee 
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involvement at this level (so-called Cooperation Councils), and the general 
guidelines for staff policy at the hospital are formulated here, but no collective 
bargaining takes place. It is also at this level that the agreements with the TWAs 
are set.  
The second level is the hospitals themselves. At this level, collective bar-
gaining takes place within the framework of the sector agreements (those with 
Danish Regions as the employers’ association). Because the hospitals are large 
employer units, there is great variety between their HR policy and industrial 
relations.  
The structure is somewhat more complex on the employee side. The Health 
Care Cartel includes 11 trade unions, none of which are trade unions for doc-
tors. Many of these 11 trade unions organise employees at the hospitals. The 
trade union for nurses (DSR) is by far the largest. The Health Care Cartel nego-
tiates general working conditions, whereas more-occupation-specific conditions 
are negotiated by the individual trade unions. The Health Care Cartel became in 
mid-2014 part of a new broader cartel, Forhandlingsforbundet, together  with 
the bargaining cartel for employees in the municipalities, KTO, among others. 
In the future, this will be the only bargaining cartel regarding the hospital’s 
group of employees.  
The trade union for nurses  - DSR - has 61,000 members. Their precise or-
ganisational density is unknown but is estimated to be around 85–90 percent. 
However, it has declined during the last decade for several reasons. One is a 
weakened tendency for newly graduated nurses to automatically sign up as un-
ion members. Another is a consequence of an increase in the member fee due to 
a major industrial conflict related to the collective bargaining round in 2008.  
3F (Fagligt Fælles Forbund) is the largest member organisation of the largest 
Danish trade union confederation, LO. 3F has around 350,000 members and is a 
general union organisation which organises employees with short or no voca-
tional education, primarily in the private manufacturing, construction and 
transport sectors, but also in some private services and in the public sector. Of 
the selected occupations in this report, 3F organises hospital porters, cleaning 
assistants and skilled service assistants.  
FOA (Fag og Arbejde) is also a member of LO and represents occupations 
with short education nearly exclusively in the public sector. FOA has around 
200,000 members. Of the selected occupations here, FOA organises social care 
workers, hospital assistants and skilled service assistants.  
The alternative, so-called yellow, unions, do not have many members work-
ing in hospitals, according to the interviewees.  
In the public sector, the collective agreements create a complex web. The 
hospitals are no exception, and there is a plethora of collective agreements cov-
ering the hospitals. Some have already been mentioned. The most important for 
the present study are those between Danish Regions/RTLN and these organisa-
tions: 
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 Health Bargaining Cartel (Sundhedskartellet), KTO, AC and FOA re-
garding most health staff below doctors (sector level)  
 DSR regarding nurses (occupational level) 
 FOA regarding social and health care workers 
 3F regarding skilled service assistants (occupational level) 
 FOA and 3F regarding cleaning assistants etc., including hospital help-
ers (occupational level) 
 FOA regarding hospital porters (occupational level) 
 
Areas that have been partly privatized – for instance, cleaning – are covered by 
private sector collective agreements and will not be covered in the present chap-
ter.  
Collective bargaining coverage is close to 100 percent. See below for a de-
scription of the occupations.  
 
4.2 Wages and working conditions for the different employment types 
Some occupations at the hospitals are irrelevant to discuss in relation to this 
study of atypical work, mainly because these occupations do not include precar-
iousness to any notable extent. Medical doctors will therefore be excluded. Alt-
hough some forms of atypical work can be found in this occupation, they are 
high-salary positions with high levels of job-, employment- (defined in terms of 
employability, though not necessarily in their present job) and social security. 
This also applies to some extent to doctors on fixed-term contracts and TWA 
doctors. Moreover, medical doctors have good opportunities for voice because 
their trade unions are relatively strong in the industrial relations system. Long 
working hours along with work intensification are sometimes perceived as a 
problem among medical doctors, but they often have opportunities to influence 
such working conditions.  
The other occupations mentioned in section 5.1 are all relevant to discuss in 
relation to atypical work and precariousness. Cleaners will not be dealt with in 
any great depth, although they are relevant in relation to precariousness, and 
cleaning has been outsourced in all hospitals. This is so for a number of reasons. 
It can be discussed whether cleaning taking place at hospitals can really be seen 
as part of the hospital sector or whether it should rather be considered part of 
industrial cleaning. There is no straightforward answer to this question, but in 
this project it was decided to treat such job tasks mainly as industrial cleaning. 
By doing so, unnecessary overlap between the two chapters is prevented. How-
ever, some ‘combined occupations’ which combine cleaning and care-giving 
have been created at hospitals. These occupations will be included in the fol-
lowing.  
First, the general picture of employment types will be described. Secondly, 
nurses’ wages and working conditions will be described and discussed, fol-
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lowed by other health staff and support staff, and finally wage-subsidy con-
tracts, which are employment types related to active labour market policy. 
Hospital employment by employment type 
A tailored calculation from Statistics Denmark (see table 5.1) allows us to draw 
a number of conclusions about employment and employment types (across oc-
cupations) in hospitals.  
 
Table 4.1: Employees by employment type in the hospital sector, 2007–2001 
 2007 2010 2013 
Full-time 110,000 127,000 120,000 
Part-time  
- Marginal part-time* 
74,000 
36,000 
85,000 
24,000 
88,000 
33,000 
Fixed-term contracts 14,000 12,000 14,000 
Open ended contracts 96,000 115,000 106,000 
TAW 4,000 2,000 3,000 
Self-employed, no employees n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total (not a sum of the above) 114,000 129,000 123,000 
NB: The figures are numbers of employees, not full-time equivalents. Both private and public 
hospitals and clinics are included.  Source: Statistics Denmark, tailored calculation, AKU. * = 15 
hours or below, de facto working hours. Numbers below 2,000 not reported by Statistics Denmark 
(= n.a.). 
 
Firstly, the number of jobs increased until 2010. Hence, the effects of the eco-
nomic crisis were seen later here than in the private sector. Secondly, as ex-
pected, part-time work is very high. However, for our project report, it is more 
important that the numbers of marginal part-timers is high, because they have 
an increased risk of precariousness. Thirdly, fixed-term contracts are relatively 
widespread. Fourthly, although TAW has attracted quite some attention, the 
numbers are quite low. Fifthly, self-employment is non-existing.  
Nurses  
The majority of nurses are employed on open-ended contracts, and self-
employed nurses are non-existing. Part-time contracts, fixed-term contracts and 
(less so) TAW are widely used within the sector and are therefore relevant em-
ployment types to dig deeper into here. The majority of the nurses are organised 
in the nurses’ trade union, DSR as described above. 
Part-time work is extremely widespread among the nurses. In 2011, 51 per-
cent of the nurses worked part-time. According to the interviewees, most em-
ployees held long part-time contracts with more than 30 hours  per week. The 
average working week for Danish nurses is 34 hours. No specific figures exist 
for hospitals, but according to the interviewees, the average working week may 
very likely be higher than in the local government sector. Since 2008, the part-
timers have had the right to be upgraded to full-time employees, but very few 
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have exploited this opportunity (dr.dk, 16.06.11). Indeed, part-time work among 
nurses is predominantly voluntary. Apart from being paid according to working 
hours, part-timers have the same wages and the same employment and working 
conditions as full-timers, and the social benefits are the same. As a result, pre-
cariousness does not seem to be a problem for part-time nurses.  
The nurses working as temps often hold a full-time or a part-time open-
ended contract and are therefore mainly temping as a secondary job. This needs 
further explanation. Between 2000 and 2010, a shortage of nurses developed. 
This led the hospitals to follow a dual strategy. One part of the strategy was to 
recruit nurses from abroad (often from non-EU countries), and the other was to 
increase the use of temp nurses. Temp nurses are paid higher wages and have 
better opportunities to influence working hours than nurses employed on open-
ended contracts at the hospitals.  
High salaries and severe labour shortages (which had to do with, among oth-
er things, a high level of dropouts from nursing schools (Jakobsen and Rasmus-
sen, 2009)) created strong incentives for both employers and employees to use 
TAW. It has not been possible to get figures for the development in the use of 
TAW for nurses in hospitals only. However, since nurses make up the majority 
of hospital temps, the general wage-sum statistics are still relevant. The use of 
TAW peaked in 2007–2009, when it accounted for approximately 3 percent of 
the total wage sum in the regions. In 2010, however, the figure decreased to 1 
percent and has remained at this level since (regioner.dk 14.08.14); see also 
table 5.1 for numbers of TAW, which shows a similar, although less dramatic, 
reduction). Figures for sold hours of work from TWAs for all nurses (also those 
working elsewhere than in the hospitals) shows a decline in the same period 
from 6 to 3 percent of all hours across branches/occupations (Statistic Denmark 
2014e) . The main reason for the dramatic decline was the hospitals’ overspend-
ing in relation to their use of TAW in 2007–2009. This led to cutbacks in the 
use of both external TWAs and permanent staff in 2010. In terms of hours sold 
by TWAs, the number peaked in 2008 at 255,000 hours (Dansk Erhverv, 2011) 
but has since been reduced substantially. Instead of using external TWAs, the 
hospitals started to set up their own TWAs (here labelled ‘internal agencies’) in 
order to lower the cost. Nurses that sign up to the internal agencies still have the 
advantage of influencing their own working time, but, in contrast to external 
temps, they do not have the advantage of higher wages.  
Both before and after 2010, the large majority of nurses signing up for exter-
nal or internal temp work were on open-ended contracts in the hospitals, as 
mentioned earlier. Hence, temp work has been used by employees as a volun-
tary supplement. So far no statistics about temps are available, but according to 
the interviewees, the number of nurses working only as temps is very limited 
(see also Jakobsen and Rasmussen, 2009). Hence, temp work for nurses cannot 
be seen as precarious work.  
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Fixed-term contracts are, as mentioned, relatively widespread in hospitals 
but not among nurses, according to the interviewees. However, it has not been 
possible to provide figures for this type of employment.  
The nurses might face problems such as increased work intensifica-
tion/excessive workloads, and health and safety is a problem in some hospitals 
(Kristensen, 2013). However, the overall picture is contradictory. Nurses are 
often asked to work overtime, and it can be difficult to decline these offers. In 
2013, 11 hospitals received a ‘bad smiley’ (representing serious health and safe-
ty problems) from the national health and safety authorities. At some hospitals, 
this was related to physical health and safety, in others to time and work pres-
sure (dr.dk 13.09.13). Also the Ministry of Employment has allocated resources 
for a targeted effort among some occupations with serious health and safety 
problems to improve the conditions, including hospital nurses (bm.dk). Howev-
er, the interviewee from DSR was not sure whether work intensification really 
has taken place, although there is no doubt that the nurses are under time pres-
sure. DSR-commissioned research on the work environment (health and safety) 
for nurses in 2002, 2007 and 2012 which showed a (small) positive overall de-
velopment in the work environment for nurses, including stress and job satisfac-
tion. But it is also noteworthy that the studies confirmed serious work environ-
ment problems in some areas, such as specific hospital departments (emergency 
department and medical departments) (Kristensen, 2013). Unfortunately, the 
studies did not report anything about the variation in work environment prob-
lems between different employment types.  
In sum, with a wage level relative to the average for the qualification level, 
job security which (once again) is rather high due to low unemployment, and 
social security, including pensions, leaves and training, hospital nurses do not 
qualify for the label of ‘precarious workers’, whether they are on full-time, 
open-ended contracts or atypical contracts – despite their work environment 
problems. 
Other health care staff and support staff 
Apart from medical doctors and nurses, hospitals employ a large number of 
other health care staff and support staff. It would be impossible to cover all of 
these in the present report, and only some are relevant to discuss in relation to 
precariousness. In this report, we will focus on the largest group from the cate-
gory ‘other health staff’ and, in addition, a number of occupations among ‘sup-
port staff’, mixed ‘support staff’ and ‘other health staff’ – groups that typically 
have the most contact with patients. For all of these groups, a discussion of pre-
cariousness is relevant. The occupations are as follows:  
 
 Social and health care workers (social og sundhedsassistenter, SOSU): 
This is by far the largest group of health care staff besides nurses and 
doctors. However, their numbers have declined in recent years – from 
9,100 in 2009 to 7,600 in 2012 (Holm-Petersen et al., 2013). The divi-
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sion of labour between social care workers and nurses is often blurred 
and tends to differ from hospital to hospital. The work tasks of social 
and health care workers include personal care, medication, instruc-
tions/talks, retraining etc. Depending on previous education, it can take 
up to three and one-quarter years to become a social care worker. The 
education is a so-called dual education (periods at school combined 
with practical training at a workplace). Most social care workers are or-
ganised in the trade union FOA (foa.dk). Their do also exist a minority 
of unskilled social and health care workers.  
 Hospital porter (portør): The core task of hospital porters is to transport 
patients, including lifting patients up to surgery tables etc. However, 
hospital porters also transport equipment and other items between de-
partments in the hospitals. It takes eight months to become a hospital 
porter, and the education is also a dual education. The majority of the 
hospital porters are union members of FOA (foa.dk).  
 Hospital helper/hospital assistant (hospitalsmedhjælper/ hospitalsser-
viceassistent): Their tasks include cleaning, bed making and different 
forms of caring for patients, including serving food. The occupation is 
unskilled. The vast majority are women and are organised in 3F.  
 Cleaning assistant: This is strictly a cleaning occupation. The vast ma-
jority are women and are organised in 3F.  
 Skilled service assistants (erhvervsuddannede serviceassistenter): This 
is a relatively new occupation. It resulted from employers’ wishes to in-
crease functional flexibility along with trade unions’ need to train their 
unskilled members in order to improve their job and employment secu-
rity. The occupation was developed from the cleaning assistant occupa-
tion but includes some of the tasks of hospital porters and hospital help-
ers. It takes two years to become a skilled service assistant. The educa-
tion is a dual education. The broad range of tasks improves the oppor-
tunity to set up full-time positions. Most skilled service assistants are 
organised in 3F and are women. According to the interviewees, there 
have been some tensions between 3F and FOA regarding the set-up of 
the occupation for skilled service assistants. Moreover, hospital porters 
– which are nearly all male – seem uninterested in the new occupation, 
possibly because of its strong cleaning duties. In the future, some re-
gions will employ only skilled service assistants and not hospital help-
ers, hospital porters or cleaning assistants.  
 
As long as the focus is on the hospital sector, the abovementioned occupations 
appear not to be precarious to any notable extent. The positions are, in general, 
full-time open-ended contracts or long part-time contracts that tend to be volun-
tary. For the abovementioned groups organised by FOA, 58 percent were on 
full-time contracts (FOA 2012). With a collectively agreed monthly minimum 
wage of around €3,000 for the full-time positions – along with the possibility of 
(limited) locally agreed wage supplements – ‘working poor’ and other pay-
related elements of precariousness are rare.  
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There are, however, some problems and challenges which are relatively sim-
ilar across the five selected occupations. With regard to part-time employment, 
so-called hourly employees represent a challenge in some regards. In the re-
gions (including the hospitals), 6 percent of the employees in those areas where 
FOA sign collective agreements are paid by the hour, whilst the figure for the 
municipalities is 12 percent (FOA, 2012). The problem with hourly employees 
is that their access to some social benefits is restricted compared to their full-
time colleagues. Whilst they do receive occupational pensions after 10 months 
of employment (graduated according to the number of hours they work), they 
have no rights to pay during sick leave or maternity, paternity and parental 
leave. However, since August 2014, it has only been possible to employ hourly 
employees if their contract lasts one month or less (see below).  In that way, a 
number of formerly hourly employees have become eligible for various forms 
of social benefits.  
Regarding temps, the use of external TWAs in relation to other health care 
staff and support staff has declined substantially during the last few years. The 
number of temps in these employment categories is, however, unknown. But as 
in the case of the nurses, most temps also have a full-time contract according to 
the interviewees. In general, these temps cannot be seen as precarious. There 
has been a similar trend in the shift from external to internal temps among so-
cial and health care workers as seen among the nurses. 
There are some employment types in the hospitals which include real ele-
ments of precariousness. One special category of fixed-term employees is ‘em-
ployees on occurrence of a special event’ (begivenhedsbegrænset ansættelse). 
This type of fixed-term employment relates to an event, which can be sick 
leave, maternity/paternity leave or another kind of leave. A study conducted by 
one of the authors of the present report, but which, however, covers only the 
municipalities and not the regions, showed that the use of this type of temporary 
contract is a direct consequence of the EU directive for fixed-term employment 
from 2002, simply because it was not legal to use this type of fixed-term con-
tract before (Larsen 2002). The implication of the use of this type of fixed-term 
contract is that the employment relation can be terminated on short notice (one 
day notice). Hence, it is a very flexible type of contract and very popular with 
employers. According to the trade union FOA, this type of fixed-term contract 
is used mainly to meet employers’ need for flexibility rather than employees’ 
need for job security. Another type of fixed-term employment used is the ‘call 
temp’ (tilkaldevikar). These are not from TWAs but can be called for when 
sudden needs for more labour arise. According to the trade union FOA, the 
problem with call temps is, that the employee often cannot reject the assignment 
when called (FOA, 2012). The extent of the use of these contracts for the occu-
pations in focus is not known to us.  
Regarding the rights to social benefits, thresholds for accruing rights to these 
– already described in the previous chapters – also represent a challenge for 
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temps, fixed-term employees and also some marginal part-time employees the 
‘other health care staff and support staff’. However, the majority of the ‘other 
health care staff and support staff’ employees do not face these thresholds, alt-
hough a minority face a thresholds up to 10 months or even longer
4
. For the 
nurses no such threshold exists. All monthly employees have – according to the 
Salaried Employees Act – a three-month notice period after a trial period of 
three months. 
Work intensification/excessive workload is an issue, as indicated in the sec-
tion on nurses. However, also in this case, it is not clear whether work intensifi-
cation has been taking place or whether it varies between different employment 
types.  
One of the most important challenges for at least some of the five occupa-
tions is related not so much to wages and working and employment conditions 
but to job and employment security. With the exception of skilled service assis-
tants, the number of employees within all employee groups has declined in re-
cent years. For social care workers, the decline started in 2009. According to 
some interviewees, the explanation is that hospitals are increasingly requesting 
personnel with higher qualifications, leading to the employment of more nurses 
and fewer social care workers. Another interviewee explained the development 
by the fact that nurses are in a better position now than before to influence re-
cruitment processes at hospitals. Whatever the real reason(s), the situation has 
created some tensions between DSR, the nurses’ trade union, and FOA, the 
social care workers’ trade union. With respect to hospital porters, cleaning as-
sistants and hospital helpers, the pressure may primarily come from increased 
competition for jobs from the new occupation, skilled service assistants.  
In sum, although there might be some problems related to some of the em-
ployment categories, the dimensions of precariousness seem to be limited for 
the five occupations analysed here, although they do exist in relation to some 
employment types.. Interestingly, there seems to be a difference between the 
regions – which are in focus here, since they are responsible for the hospitals – 
and the municipalities, which have occupations similar to these five. The use of 
nearly all the ‘problematic’ employment types (call temps, employees on occur-
rence of a special event, hourly paid) is more widespread in the local govern-
ment–administered health care sector than in the regional sector. For example, 
nearly all of FOA’s health care–related legal cases are in the local government 
sector. According to some interviewees, one important reason is that the work-
places are much bigger in the regions (they are hospitals) than in the municipali-
ties, which allows for planning and use of resources in the regions. In the local 
government workplaces, which are much smaller (e.g., home care, nursing 
                                                     
4 The pattern is rather complex: Social and health care workers (skilled) and porters have no pension thresh-
old when the education is finishedand, whereas Social and health care workers (unskilled) face a 10 months 
employment threshold and an age threshold of 21 years. Skilled service assistants face a pension threshold 
including 10 months of regional employment and an age threshold of 21 year. Hospital helpers/hospital 
assistants (unskilled) have a pension threshold of 48 months of regional employment and an age threshold of 
25 year.  
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homes), employers feel more dependent on flexible types of contracts and, more 
so than the regions, use them in ways seen as problematic by the trade unions. 
Moreover, regional employers have formulated a ‘policy for full-time posi-
tions’, which took force in January 2014. The municipalities do not have such a 
policy. The policy implies that new positions in the regions in general should be 
full-time positions and includes targets for full-time employees in the regions 
(64 percent in 2015 and 80 percent in 2021) but also a number of possibilities 
for exemptions, which could be a barrier for reaching the targets (Danske Re-
gioner, 2013). However, the interviewees stated that the policy was serious and 
genuine. The reason for the regional employers to formulate such a policy was 
not to improve the employment situation for part-timers, but due to foreseen 
labour shortages. During labour shortages, it is a problem if three employees on 
average only deliver working hours for two full-time employees.  
Wage-subsidy contracts  
Denmark is one of the countries in Europe – and in the world – which spends 
the most on active labour market policy (ALMP). The positive side of this is 
that a large number of unemployed persons get assistance to get back into em-
ployment. The downside is that employers in some situations are tempted to 
substitute ordinary employees with ‘extraordinary employees’, mainly wage-
subsidized labour of one kind or another. Moreover, and relevant for the present 
report, it might be a problem for wage-subsidy employees if the positions are 
permanent and have lower levels of wages and working and employment condi-
tions than for other employees. 
The use of extraordinary employees also is much less widespread in the re-
gional health care sector than in the local government sector. According to the 
interviewees, this is because it is much more difficult to find suitable positions 
at hospitals for unskilled persons and persons with reduced capacity. Moreover, 
the Jobcentres (which are part of the municipal administrative structure) have 
until very recently not pushed the hospitals to take part in ALMP, focusing in-
stead on the municipalities. However, recently hospitals have started to receive 
increased contact from the Jobcentres in order to set up extraordinary employ-
ment positions in unskilled areas. Still, extraordinary employees are not nearly 
as widespread in the regions as they are in the municipal health care sector.  
Nearly all extraordinary employment positions are temporary, in some cases 
for a maximum of one year but often much shorter. Although they might repre-
sent other problems, a discussion of precariousness is not so relevant for tempo-
rary wage-subsidy positions, because they last for such a short period. For per-
manent positions, such a discussion is relevant. There is basically only one of 
these, the so-called flexi-job (see chapter 2). Flexi-jobs are permanent wage-
subsidy jobs with reduced working hours; their aim is to provide a better alter-
native to incapacity benefits for disabled people. Until 2013, flexi-jobbers were 
guaranteed a salary equal to a full-time job irrespective of their working week, 
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although the wage-subsidy dimension had a maximum. However, the scheme 
was changed recently, and the new rules came in force in 2013. As a conse-
quence of these changes, flexi-jobbers are not necessarily paid ‘the rate for the 
job’ (collectively agreed wages), and the wage subsidy is less attractive for em-
ployers. Moreover, it is now possible to set up flexi-jobs for only a few hours 
per week, so-called mini-flexi-jobs. There are around 2,000 flexi-jobbers in the 
regions, accounting for less than 2 percent of all employees.  
 
4.3 Social partners’ approaches to atypical work in the sector 
First, we will focus on the initiatives that are not limited to the selected occupa-
tions but have consequences for them all, and thereafter examine the initiatives 
that are specific to the selected occupations.  
Cross-sector/-occupational initiatives  
Most cross-occupational initiatives are related to both the regions and the mu-
nicipalities.  
Regarding fixed-term employees, it is worth mentioning the framework 
agreement between KL (Local Government Denmark, the interest-organisation 
of the municipalities), Danish Regions (then the Organisation of Danish Coun-
ties), KTO and the Health Cartel from 2002. The agreement implements the EU 
directive on fixed-term work from 1999 with the aim of improving the condi-
tions for these employees. The agreement secure non-discrimination on a num-
ber of wage- and working condition–related dimensions, but not all. For in-
stance, according to the initial agreement, an employee has a right to occupa-
tional pensions only after one year of employment (minimum eight hours per 
week) within the latest eight years. The initial agreement also secured that most 
hourly employees with more than eight hours per week during one month 
should be employed as monthly salaried workers, hence providing them with 
the status of salaried employees, including longer terms of notice and better 
social rights.  
Regarding both part-time and fixed-term work, it emerged recently that the 
European Commission is not satisfied with the way the directive on part-time 
work from 1997 has been implemented in Denmark; in 2012 the Danish gov-
ernment received a ‘letter of formal notice’ (åbningsskrivelse), and in 2013, a 
‘justified statement’ (begrundet udtalelse) that requested the Danish government 
to improve the implementation of the directive beyond the one provided by the 
collective agreements (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2012; 2013). The European 
Commission stated in the letters that part-time employees in the education sec-
tor with less than eight hours of employment per week were not being treated 
equally to full-time employees (regarding social rights and benefits, terms of 
notice etc.). As a result of this process, an agreement between KL and KTO was 
recently signed to meet the demands from the European Commission. The 
agreement ensures that only employees employed on fixed-term contracts of 
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maximum one month, including call temps, can be employed as hourly paid 
employees. Thus, all employees on contracts longer than one month have the 
status as salaried employee and have  the right to an occupational pension at the 
same level as employees on open-ended contracts, as well as paid sick leave and 
terms of notice like those of full-time salaried employees, which is minimum 
three months after a three-month trial period. The agreement came into force in 
August 2014 and covers not only the education sector but the entire regional 
and public sectors.  
The EU temporary agency work directive, adopted in 2008, was implement-
ed in Denmark in the summer 2013 (see chapter 3). In May 2013, the legislation 
on the directive was finally passed by Parliament. To avoid social dumping, 
exemption from the non-discrimination principle is possible only through col-
lective agreements between the most representative social partner organisations 
in Denmark; thus, non-Danish TWAs cannot use collective agreements as a 
basis for exemption (Ministry of Employment 2013). However, the trade unions 
were not happy with the result, although they signed it, because it implies that 
in some sector branches, they will be bound to rather old agreements with 
TWAs that do not secure non-discrimination. The trade union interviewees in 
the present project also felt that the result of the implementation in Denmark 
watered down the directive to some extent.  
Whereas the usual order in Denmark has been implementation by collective 
agreement first and then follow-up legislation, the implementation of the TAW 
directive in Denmark was reversed. This was so because the social partners in 
the manufacturing industry found that there were too many uncertainties. There-
fore, they awaited the law before they dared to write anything into the collective 
agreements.  
Regarding part-time work, in 2007, in connection to a tripartite agreement in 
the public sector, the social partners (including those in the regions) agreed that 
employees on open-ended contracts for 29 hours per week or more should have 
a right to a full-time position in a trial period from 2008 to 2011. No studies 
have been found on the extent to which this right has been used. During the 
collective bargaining round in 2011, it was not possible for the social partners to 
agree to extend the trial period, to the regret of some trade unions (foa.dk, 
08.02.2013).  
Also related to part-time work, the regional employers in Danish Regions 
have formally adopted a policy on full-time positions in the regions, as men-
tioned earlier. The policy came into force in 2014, and it remains to be seen 
what the outcome of this initiative will be.  
Whereas there seems to be a consensus on attempts to increase the share of 
full-timers at hospitals and other regional workplaces, the social partners seem 
to still be far apart when it comes to hourly employees. The trade unions dislike 
the employers’ tendency to propose hourly contracts with a very low number of 
hours that are extended when the employers need to do so. And trade unions 
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disapprove of the employers keeping employees as hourly year after year. How-
ever, the use of hourly employees is not so widespread in the regions as men-
tioned earlier.  
Regarding wage-subsidy jobs, KL discussed this issue with the trade union 
confederations (DSR is a member of the second-largest trade union confedera-
tion, FTF) in a number of tripartite bodies, most importantly in the consultative 
national, regional and local employment councils. However, it is in the bipartite 
collective bargaining arena that the social partners have the best opportunity to 
influence the issue. The issues discussed here, however, have lately been not so 
much about pay and conditions of wage-subsidy jobs but rather about the num-
ber of these. The reason is that the wage-subsidy jobs in some (unskilled) occu-
pations within the municipalities make up around half of all employees, which 
KTO and the affiliated trade unions find to be far too many because the high 
number leads to the displacement of ordinary employees and downward wage 
pressure. KL and the municipalities, on the other hand, are obliged to deliver 
wage-subsidy jobs according to a certain quota and moreover have economic 
incentives in some cases to use wage-subsidy jobs on a large scale. During the 
latest bargaining rounds, social partners were unable to strike an agreement on 
the issue (Mailand, 2012; forthcoming). However, KL and KTO (now 
Fællesforbundet) do still have some form of dialogue on the issue. Regarding 
hospitals, the use of wage-subsidy jobs is growing, as described, but at a very 
low level. In the future, they might therefore also develop into a challenge for 
the social partners in the regions (hospitals).  
Sector-/occupation-specific initiatives  
There are only few occupation-specific initiatives the social partners have relat-
ed specifically to atypical employment. This reflects partly that the most serious 
challenges are not limited to these occupations alone and are therefore ad-
dressed at a higher level (those mentioned above), and partly that the social 
partners do not find that wages and employment and working conditions of 
atypical employment in hospitals are leading to precarious situations to any 
notable extent.  
One of the few initiatives is that threshold for accruing social rights has been 
lowered for some groups of employees, latest at the collective bargaining round 
in 2013 from 12 months to 10 months. This has consequences for pensions etc. 
for the fixed-term employees. However, several of the occupations in focus 
working at the hospitals has no thresholds regarding pension or other social 
rights. 
The (successful) attempts to curb the increase in the use of external temps by 
using internal temps have been a unilateral step for employers. The step has 
been taken for purely economic reasons and has had nothing to do with wages 
and conditions of temps, who furthermore do not qualify for a label of precari-
ousness.  
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4.4 Summary  
In industrial relation terms, ‘hospitals’ are not really a sector, but this group is 
nearly identical with the ‘regional’ sector in Denmark. Hospitals could also be 
seen as part of the health care sector. Most forms of collective bargaining and 
other forms of social dialogue with relevance for the issue of precariousness 
regarding hospitals take part at this regional level between the employers in 
Danish Regions and the bargaining cartel Sundhedskartellet and – regarding 
more occupation-specific issues – between Danish Regions and the single trade 
unions. 
Regarding wages and employment and working conditions, the nurses and 
other health care and support staff analysed in this chapter generally face few 
precariousness challenges, whether they are on open-ended full-time contracts 
or other types of contracts. The use of (external) TAW has been reduced to a 
very low level, and, more importantly, TAW (whether of the external or internal 
type) is nearly exclusively voluntary and is used by workers to top up full-time 
or long part-time open-ended contracts. Self-employment is non-existing. How-
ever, both fixed-term work and marginal part-time work are relatively wide-
spread. In general, the atypical employees are eligible for pensions, paid sick 
leave and other social benefits, but some of the thresholds are still long and 
longer than in the private sector. This is the case for the 10-month threshold for 
accruing pensions, which however only apply for some groups of employees 
(see footnote 4) and not the nurses. Wage-subsidy jobs are rising in number but 
from a very low level.  
Reflecting the lack of widespread precariousness problems, the social part-
ners’ initiatives to address the problems have been few, most of them initiated 
at a level above the regions/hospitals.  
This is not to say that problems related to precariousness are totally absent in 
the hospitals. The social benefit threshold problem has already been mentioned. 
Moreover, a number of part-time positions under the heading of ‘hourly paid 
employees’, among other health care and support staff, until recently lacked 
rights to pensions and full paid sick leave, and had a shorter term of notice and 
possibly also marginal part-time–related problems, but changes in the collective 
agreements implemented in August 2014 might reduce these problems. It is 
noteworthy that this change was made owing to pressure from the European 
Commission, and not the social partners’ own initiative. Moreover, although an 
in-depth study about the quality of the work environment did not indicate an 
overall worsening of this, the same study showed that some hospital occupa-
tions and departments exhibit serious health and safety problems, including 
work intensification. This problem is not limited to atypical employees.  
A number of reservations with regard to the finding of a limited presence of 
dimensions of precariousness in the hospitals should be mentioned. Firstly, the 
strictly cleaning occupation has not been dealt with to any notable extent, since 
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it is covered in the chapter on industrial cleaning, and it can be discussed 
whether it is part of the hospital sector at all just because the work processes 
take place at hospitals. Secondly, according to some of the trade union inter-
viewees, the health and social care sector outside hospitals includes greater 
challenges of precariousness and sees far more labour law cases.  
 
 
5. Industrial cleaning  
 
5.1 Introduction to the sector 
In Denmark, industrial cleaning covers services ranging from ordinary cleaning 
inside and outside buildings and window cleaning to specialized cleaning ser-
vices like pest control in buildings and cleaning of swimming pools, trains and 
busses. However, although ‘combined services’ primarily concerns the mainte-
nance of buildings and is therefore not considered industrial cleaning, the cate-
gory of combined services also includes various cleaning tasks which typically 
are part of the service package offered to companies when they outsource clean-
ing tasks. Indeed, this type of service package has become more popular among 
companies in recent years, and as a result, the level of ordinary cleaning and 
window-cleaning services has reportedly declined in terms of turnover and 
number of staff since 2009 (DI, 2014c). Nevertheless, ordinary cleaning contin-
ues to be the most common type of cleaning service by far, followed by com-
bined services, specialized cleaning and window cleaning based on company 
turnover within the sector (DI, 2011; 2014c).  
Cleaning services are provided by a number of suppliers in the public and 
private sector. However, the recent increase in outsourcing affected the industri-
al cleaning sector in terms of rising growth rates and an increasing number of 
companies and employees up until 2008, when the economic crisis hit the sector 
(DI, 2014c). Since 2008, the economic turnover of cleaning companies has de-
clined, and the number of companies and employees has decreased (DI, 2014c). 
It is particularly the small companies – notably, self-employed without employ-
ees – that have gone bankrupt following the economic crisis; nearly one-third of 
cleaning companies without employees have disappeared since 2003 (see table 
5.1). 
 The industrial cleaning sector is dominated by small companies – notably, 
self-employed without employees. In 2012, 63 percent of the companies were 
self-employed without employees, whilst 0.4 percent had more than 100 em-
ployees and 32 percent between 1 and 10 employees. The companies employed 
1.3 percent of the Danish workforce in 2012. Most employees – 80 percent – 
worked for large and medium-sized companies, the latter defined as companies 
with 10–100 employees (Statistics Denmark, 2014f).  
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Table 5.1: Development in the industrial cleaning sector in percentages and 
actual numbers, 2000–2014 
 2012 2011 2010 2009 2003 2000/01 
Companies 5,504 5,602 5,530 5,718 6,643 5,819 
Self-employed 
without employ-
ees 
3,476 3,547 3,439 —  4,742 — 
Number of em-
ployees – calcu-
lated as full-time 
positions 
24,063 
 
23,651 
 
24,456 
 
— — — 
Economic turn-
over in millions in 
euros 
21.124  21.373 
 
21.431 
 
— — — 
Source: Statistics Denmark (2014f); Mormont (2004); Christensen and Jørgensen (2012).  
 
Employees typically work as cleaning assistants, cleaning technicians, ser-
vice helpers/assistants, window cleaners and house assistants. Service help-
ers/assistants and service technicians are primarily skilled workers who have 
had formal training as a professional cleaner. In the private sector, the picture is 
a bit more blurred, as the title of service helper/assistant in some instances also 
includes unskilled workers, since some private companies use this title when 
recruiting unskilled cleaning personnel. The other groups of cleaning personnel 
are unskilled workers – many without any form of formal qualifications. Indeed, 
recent figures have revealed that 62 percent of the employees within industrial 
cleaning are without any educational credentials. The share of unskilled workers 
continues to be high compared to the rest of the labour market (DI, 2014c: 27).  
According to the interviewees, many employees within the sector can be 
considered to belong to some of the weakest groups within the Danish labour 
market. They often have no formal skills and may experience learning difficul-
ties as many are dyslexic or are unable to speak, read and/or write Danish. 
Among this group of employees, some also tend to have difficulties socialising 
and getting along with other people in the workplace. A cleaning job is, for 
many, their only option to be part of the labour market. In addition, the industri-
al cleaning sector is dominated by women and migrant workers; migrant work-
ers constitute 38 percent of the workforce, a figure three times higher than in the 
rest of the Danish labour market (DI, 2014c: 27). 
Collective agreement coverage 
The Danish industrial cleaning sector is regulated primarily through collective 
agreements signed by social partners at the sectoral and company levels. A re-
cent study by Andersen and Felbo-Kolding (2013b) suggested that 62 percent of 
the companies with five or more employees within the  industrial cleaning sec-
tor are covered by a collective agreement – a number that the interviewees esti-
mate to be slightly lower, around 40–50 percent, as they also include companies 
with fewer than five employees in their estimate. However, the coverage rate of 
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collective agreements is considerably higher when calculating it based on the 
total of the wage sum. Such calculations suggest that between 80 and 95 percent 
of employees are covered by a collective agreement in the private sector, indi-
cating that the collective agreement coverage is comparatively higher within the 
industrial cleaning sector than the general average for the Danish labour market 
– 84 percent (DA, 2014: 24). In addition, in the public sector, all employees are 
covered by a collective agreement.  
Employers’ associations  
Many employers – particularly small and medium-sized companies – may have 
signed a collective agreement but have not necessarily joined an employers’ 
association. A recent survey by Andersen and Felbo-Kolding (2013b) revealed 
that within the industrial cleaning sector, one in two companies with five or 
more employees are members of an employers’ association. This number is 
reportedly somewhat lower when including companies with fewer than five 
employees, which is the vast majority of companies within this sector. It is pri-
marily the large and medium-sized private companies that are members of an 
employers’ association, whilst relatively few small companies – most notably, 
self-employed without employees – have joined one.  
The main employers’ associations representing private companies in the sec-
tor are SBA and Danske Service. The latter primarily organise small and medi-
um-sized companies, whilst large and medium-sized companies tend to be 
members of SBA. In the public sector, the employers’ interests are represented 
by KL, Danske Regioner and the Ministry of Finance. 
Trade unions  
No exact figures exist as to union density. However, the interviewees estimate 
that around 40–50 percent of the employees within the industrial cleaning sector 
are union members, which is lower than the general union density of 69 percent 
for Danish labour market (Ibsen et al., 2014). The main trade unions organising 
industrial cleaners and negotiating collective agreements are 3F, Serviceforbun-
det and FOA. Unlike 3F and Serviceforbundet, FOA represents cleaning staff 
only in the public sector. A number of cleaning assistants have also joined what 
is often termed ‘alternative unions’: Det faglige hus, KRIFA and Bedst og Bil-
ligst. With the exception of KRIFA
5
, these unions have no collective agree-
ments and they – including KRIFA –represent mainly employees covered by 
collective agreements that have been signed by other trade unions.  
 
5.2 Wages and conditions for different employment types  
In the Danish industrial cleaning sector, the picture regarding employment types 
differs somewhat from the rest of the Danish labour market. The traditional full-
                                                     
5 KRIFA has a few collective agreements in the private sector, including the industrial cleaning sector, but it 
differs from the traditional unions in that it principally opposes any form of industrial action to solve  
industrial disputes. 
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time permanent position with 37 or more weekly hours is less common within 
the sector and tends to be seen mainly among employees within the public sec-
tor or those working in specialized cleaning tasks or window cleaning. In fact, 
some interviewees stated that the atypical worker within the sector is in many 
respects a permanent full-time employee. Indeed, many of the forms of em-
ployment used in this project as examples of atypical work are commonly used 
throughout the sector, although to varying degrees. 
Part-time and full-time work 
Part-time work constitutes the most common form of atypical employment 
within the sector by far and has become more widespread in recent years. In 
2013, 44 percent of industrial cleaners worked part-time compared to 24 percent 
in 2007 (Statistics Denmark, 2014g). Marginal part-time work has also become 
more common in recent years, and 16 percent of industrial cleaners have less 
than 15 weekly hours, although the collective agreements in principle guarantee 
part-time workers a minimum of 15 weekly hours (Statistic Denmark, 2014g; 
see appendix B). It is primarily industrial cleaners in the private sector that 
work relatively few hours, although part-time work also is commonly used 
throughout the local government sector. A recent survey with 107 cleaning 
companies conducted by the employers’ association Danske Service revealed 
that 71 percent of industrial cleaning companies use part-time work and 28 per-
cent of their employees have an employment contract with less than 10 weekly 
hours, whilst 15 percent have between 10 and 15 weekly hours (Danske Ser-
vice, 2014).  
In the public sector, part-time work is also widespread among industrial 
cleaners. In the local government sector – which employs 80 percent of indus-
trial cleaners in the public sector – 24 percent of the cleaning staff hold a full-
time permanent position with 37 or more weekly hours (KL, 2014c). These 
figures also reveal, though, that 16 percent of industrial cleaners within the local 
government sector work less than 19 hours per week; the most common pattern 
for part-time work is between 28 and 36 weekly hours (KL, 2014). This sug-
gests that although part-time work is commonly used throughout the local gov-
ernment sector, part-time workers often hold contracts with more hours com-
pared to the private sector.  
That part-time work, particularly contracts with relatively few weekly hours, 
is widespread within industrial cleaning affects the employees’ wage and work-
ing conditions in different ways. Many part-time workers often work double 
shifts and hold two or more jobs to earn a reasonable income. Their low number 
of weekly hours also affects their eligibility for unemployment benefits as re-
cent rule changes demand that they work 13 hours per week over a continuous 
three-year period. Likewise, their occupational pension contributions and paid 
holiday entitlements may also be affected, as pension contributions are calculat-
ed based on a percentage of the employee’s monthly salary. This, combined 
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with industrial cleaning being a low-paid job, exposes part-time workers to a 
greater risk of lower levels of pensions in old age and lower levels of unem-
ployment benefits. They are therefore in many respects at greater risk of precar-
iousness, although they are covered by collective agreements and meet the as-
sessment criteria outlined in the collective agreements and the labour law (see 
appendix B). 
With respect to job security and employability as well, part-time workers 
face lower levels of security – a situation that also applies to industrial cleaners 
working full-time. Industrial cleaners are often unskilled workers with no edu-
cational credentials, and they rarely exploit the opportunity of further training to 
upgrade their skill levels and thereby improve their employability. In addition, 
private industrial cleaning companies often terminate the contract of their em-
ployees when they renew or bid on new cleaning contracts as part of compulso-
ry tendering – a process that typically takes place every second or third year, 
according to the interviewees. Therefore, being employed on a full-time open-
ended contract is no guarantee of a high level of job and employment security, 
as their employment contract also is up for renewal every two or three years, 
indicating a relatively high turnover among cleaning staff. However, most em-
ployees tend to stay in their job but typically on different terms and conditions, 
and with a different employer if their current employer loses the bidding, ac-
cording to the interviewees. Indeed, when cleaning contracts are up for re-
tendering, some cleaning companies reportedly use this opportunity to intensify 
the workload, reduce the number of weekly hours or sometimes lay off people. 
Regarding voice, many industrial cleaners work at companies where union 
density is low and without a shop steward (Larsen and Navrbjerg, 2010). If their 
cleaning job has been outsourced, they often work under different collective 
agreements and feel excluded from the workers’ community at the workplace, 
even if they still work at the same place as earlier, since their employer has 
changed. Many also work in shifts, during late hours, on their own and at differ-
ent workplaces than their colleagues, which makes it difficult for them to meet 
and talk with their co-workers. This form of isolation also puts industrial clean-
ers at greater risk of exploitation.  
A recent study, along with court rulings and media reports, revealed that, 
migrant workers within industrial cleaning in particular often work long hours 
without receiving the minimum wage, payments for overtime or other social 
benefits, indicating that working full-time is no guarantee against precarious-
ness (Korsby, 2011). Indeed, social dumping seems to be a common phenome-
non within the sector, and many industrial cleaners reportedly accept this be-
cause they are afraid of losing their job or unaware of the rules and regulations. 
Recent studies support this and suggest that 30 percent of cleaning companies 
are wage dumpers in that their hourly wage is between €13.3 and €14.7, and 3 
percent pay less than €13.3 euros per hour, whilst the minimum wage varies 
between €15.7 and €29.9 depending on the collective agreement under consid-
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eration (Danske Service, 2014; DI et al., 2014; Andersen and Felbo-Kolding, 
2013a: 148). That 55 percent of companies have called for a legislative mini-
mum wage underlines the problems of wage dumping within the sector (Ander-
sen and Felbo-Kolding, 2013b). 
Self-employed without employees and bogus self-employed  
Self-employed without employees is also common within the industrial cleaning 
sector. 63 percent of cleaning companies are small companies with only the 
owner and no other employees, and they represent 17 percent of the employees 
within the industrial cleaning sector (Statistics Denmark, 2014d; 2014e). To 
what extent these companies are examples of bogus self-employed or represent 
genuine small companies is uncertain, but most interviewees – both employers 
and union representatives – reported that bogus self-employment is less wide-
spread within the sector than in the construction sector. They all, however, gave 
examples of employees that voluntary or involuntary had opted for self-
employment and were then used as subcontractors by their former employer in 
order to cut costs and bypass the rules and regulations within the collective 
agreements. That many small companies, including self-employed without em-
ployees, reportedly sign adoption agreements (‘tiltrædelsesoverenskomst’) sug-
gests that they represent genuine small companies and are not bogus self-
employed.  
Working as self-employed without employees has its risks: Firstly, the col-
lective agreements and the labour law do not cover such employees, as they are 
considered companies. Secondly, there is a high risk of bankruptcy for such 
companies, as mentioned earlier. Thirdly, the self-employed often lack social 
protection, and they have no guaranteed income due to their status as self-
employed, even if their employment relation is somewhat between what is con-
sidered a normal employee and true self-employed worker (Jørgensen and De 
Paz Lima, 2011). They therefore face a greater risk of precariousness. However, 
when the self-employed perform cleaning services for user companies covered 
by the collective agreements within the industrial cleaning sector, they are often 
guaranteed an income equivalent to the costs the user company would have had 
if it had kept the cleaning service in house. Indeed, most collective agreements 
include such regulations to avoid unfair competition and social dumping (DI et 
al., 2014; RSBA et al., 2012).  
Fixed-term workers and temporary agency workers 
Other forms of atypical work, such as fixed-term contracts and TAW, are re-
portedly less widespread within the sector compared to part-time work and self-
employment without employees. Fixed-term contracts are used mainly when 
permanent staff fall ill or take leave, sudden ad hoc orders or new assignments 
occur etc. For such situations, most companies, including the local government 
sector, have a relatively stabile network of fixed-term workers which they rely 
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on (Larsen, 2009). These groups of employees are often recruited on a day-to-
day basis or for short periods when needs arise. In the local government sector, 
11 percent of industrial cleaners were hourly paid employees in 2014; they are 
examples of fixed-term workers with very short contracts and are typically re-
ferred to as call temps (KL, 2014c). According to a study by FOA (2012), the 
average working week of, for example, house assistants working as call temps 
is 6.6 hours, and one in five has been in such a position for two years. This sug-
gests that call temps face a greater risk of precariousness in terms of lower lev-
els of job security and income security as a result of their few weekly hours and 
short-term contracts. They can, for example, be dismissed without notice. Call 
temps are also excluded from various social benefits, such as full pay during 
sick leave and maternity, paternity and parental leave, whilst they can accrue 
other social rights, such as pensions, if they comply with the assessment criteria 
(see appendix B). No figures are available regarding call temps in the private 
sector, but reportedly, some private cleaning companies, until recently, recruited 
a number of employees on zero-hour contracts to step in when needs arose. This 
practice, however, was recently changed following new regulations by social 
partners (see section 5.3). Nevertheless, such employees, although they in prin-
ciple are permanent staff, face similar challenges as call temps, as they have no 
guaranteed income or weekly hours, even if the collective agreement ensures 
them a minimum of three hours for each shift they take.  
Fixed-term workers with long-term contracts have higher levels of job secu-
rity than their peers on short-term contracts in that they are guaranteed a perma-
nent position after six months employment, according to the collective agree-
ments in the private industrial cleaning sector. In addition, the length of their 
contract affects their ability to accrue rights to social benefits and wage supple-
ments, as fixed-term workers with long-term contracts are more likely to meet 
the assessment criteria outlined in the collective agreements – criteria that re-
quire an employment record between 0 and 12 months depending on the social 
benefit under consideration (see appendix B). Regarding voice, no figures exist 
as to union density within industrial cleaning, but recent studies reveal that 
fixed-term workers, generally speaking, are less likely to be union members or 
to be employed at a workplace with a shop steward, and often feel their interests 
are ignored in local bargaining rounds compared to their peers on open-ended 
contracts (Scheuer, 2011a; Larsen and Navrbjerg, 2011). 
The interviewees also stated that some companies use temps when acute 
needs arise. However, this form of employment is reportedly limited, mainly 
because the industrial cleaning sector generally faces great difficulties in re-
cruiting and retaining qualified cleaning personnel and prefers to have perma-
nent staff. That 6 percent of the advertised positions within industrial cleaning 
were not filled in 2013 underlines the recruitment problems within the sector 
(Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen, 2013). Media reports regarding subcontractors ex-
ploiting their personnel by offering wages and working conditions far below 
FAOS Research paper 141  
   
49 
Danish standards have decreased the use of temps. Indeed, some interviewees 
referred to these media reports as examples where the wages and working con-
ditions of such employees bordered on slave-like conditions, and social partners 
have developed responses to prevent this form of exploitation (see section 5.3). 
Whilst their employment and job security are relatively volatile due to the 
nature of their employment contract, temps are in principle guaranteed similar 
wages and social protection as the user companies’ own employees if covered 
by collective agreements within the private industrial cleaning sector. Recent 
regulation by social partners ensure that cleaning companies cannot hire TWAs 
to cut costs, as they have to pay the TWAs the equivalent of the costs the user 
company would have had, if it had kept the cleaning service in house (DI (SBA) 
et al., 2014; RSBA et al., 2012).  
Flexi-jobs and other wage-subsidy schemes 
Recent figures reveal that 21 percent of industrial cleaners in the local govern-
ment sector hold a flexi-job or work under other government-funded employ-
ment policy schemes. Using such schemes is particularly popular among hous-
ing assistants; 29 percent hold a flexi-job, 7 percent a senior job, and 7 percent 
are part of other wage-subsidy schemes (KL, 2014b; 2014a). Such employment 
types are less widespread in the private than in the public industrial cleaning 
sector, although a recent study suggested that flexi-jobs and other wage-subsidy 
schemes are more common within private industrial cleaning than elsewhere in 
the private sector (Thuesen et al., 2013; FOA, 2012: 10). In addition, both union 
and employer representatives reported that when cleaning assignments from the 
local government are outsourced to private companies, some municipalities 
request that the private companies employ a certain number of people in flexi-
jobs or on other government-funded employment policy schemes. The inter-
viewees also listed examples of companies that recruited employees to flexi-
jobs or relied on other forms of government-funded employment schemes in 
order to cut costs. Wages and working conditions of people in flexi-jobs follow 
the rules and regulations of comparable full-time employees. Up until 2013, 
people in flexi-jobs reportedly had slightly better wage conditions than their 
peers on part-time open-ended contracts as the flexi-jobbers received full wage 
compensation despite working reduced hours. Since January 2013, flexi-jobbers 
receive salary only for the hours they work and may therefore face a greater risk 
of low wages. Regarding job and employment security, their situation may re-
portedly be slightly higher than their colleagues on open-ended contracts due to 
the economic incentives of keeping them on board, as the schemes are heavily 
subsidized by central government.  
Subcontractors  
Subcontractors, although a different category of atypical work from the above-
mentioned since they typically are companies which offer cleaning services to 
FAOS Research paper 141  
   
50 
other companies by providing various forms of flexible labour, are also wide-
spread within industrial cleaning sector – although reportedly less so than a few 
years ago. According to the interviewees, a number of companies, including 
large, small and medium-sized enterprises, until recently relied extensively on 
subcontractors to carry out different assignments when they won different con-
tracts or biddings. These subcontractors could be TWAs, small or medium-sized 
companies and/or self-employed without employees, including bogus self-
employed. However, a number of media reports revealing that the wages and 
working conditions of employees working for subcontractors were far below the 
standards set in the collective agreements, along with social partners’ initiatives 
regarding the use of subcontractors, have reportedly reduced this practice.  
Many large industrial cleaning companies no longer use subcontractors, and 
it is no longer possible to rely on subcontractors to reduce labour costs and 
thereby compete on employee wages if the user company is covered by a collec-
tive agreement (see also section 5.3). The case of a Polish TWA operating in the 
Danish labour market offering cleaning services for €6.7 per hour, along with 
examples of migrant workers reportedly coming on busses from Eastern Europe 
to provide cleaning services to Danish companies, indicates that some compa-
nies continue to rely on subcontractors to cut costs.  
In sum, some industrial cleaners, depending on their employment contract, 
face an increased risk of precariousness when examining different parameters 
such as wages, social benefits, working time and job and employment security. 
It is in particular marginal part-time workers, fixed-term workers with very 
short contracts and temps with short-term contracts that are exposed to lower 
levels of social protection, although the thresholds for accruing rights to social 
benefits, a notice period and wage supplements within the collective agreements 
covering the industrial cleaning sector are among the lowest in the Danish la-
bour market (see appendix A and B). However, the recent media reports regard-
ing exploitation of migrant workers, who often work long hours without wage 
compensation or social protection, suggest that a full-time job is no guarantee of 
not ending up as a precarious worker within industrial cleaning.  
 
5.3 Social partners’ approaches to atypical work in the sector 
Improving and ensuring the wages and working conditions of atypical workers 
has  been on the bargaining agenda of social partners within industrial cleaning 
in recent years. However, social partners seldom use the term ‘atypical workers’ 
since they rarely differentiate between the different forms of employment. Both 
unions and employers have initiated responses to some of the challenges facing 
employees and employers within industrial cleaning. Some initiatives have been 
developed jointly by unions and employers’ associations and have been includ-
ed in their collective agreements. Others have been employer or union led, and 
yet another set of initiatives has been up for negotiation between the social part-
ners but has been unsuccessful for various reasons.  
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The main changes include (1) lowering the thresholds for accruing rights to 
social benefits and improving social benefits by agreeing to new rights regard-
ing, for example, further training, (2) developing new rules and regulations for 
subcontractors, including temps, (3) improving the working conditions of call 
temps and (4) raising union density and collective bargaining coverage.  
New rights and lower thresholds for accruing rights to social benefits  
During the last 10 years, the social partners have lowered the threshold for ac-
cruing rights to social benefits within the collective agreements. In the private 
sector, the main changes took place during the collective bargaining rounds at 
the sector level in 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2014, whilst in the public sector, these 
thresholds were less subject to revisions during the bargaining rounds that took 
place in 2008, 2011 and 2013.  
During the 2007 bargaining round, 3F, Service Forbundet and their counter-
part SBA – the social partners of the leading collective agreement in the private 
sector – decided to remove the threshold on parents’ rights to paid leave when 
their children are hospitalised. All employees with children, irrespective of their 
employment contract, were thereby allowed to take full-paid time off if their 
children were hospitalized (DI (SBA) et al., 2007). The length of paid parental 
leave, pension contributions during maternity, paternity and parental leave and 
reimbursement entitlements have also been subject to changes on several occa-
sions in recent years; first in 2007, when new rights regarding pension contribu-
tions during parental leave were introduced; the level of extra pension contribu-
tions during parental leave for part-time workers would be calculated based on 
their number of weekly hours (DI (SBA) et al., 2007). In 2010, the number of 
weeks with full pay was increased from 9 to 11 weeks, and in 2014, paid paren-
tal leave was further extended to 13 weeks along with an increase in pension 
contributions and the threshold for wage compensation. New rights for same-
gender parents regarding access to parental leave were also introduced in 2014 
(DI (SBA) et al., 2010; 2014). However, the threshold for accessing paid paren-
tal leave has remained unchanged and continues to be nine months – making it 
difficult for some groups of atypical workers, such as fixed-term workers and 
temps, to accrue rights to these social benefits. 
By contrast, the thresholds for pension contributions, access to further train-
ing and full-paid sick leave have been subject to changes in recent years. In 
2007, 3F, Serviceforbundet and their counterpart SBA agreed to grant full-paid 
sick leave to employees with nine months’ employment record, and during the 
2010 bargaining round, they lowered the threshold to six months. In 2010, they 
also reduced the threshold for access to an occupational pension scheme from 
nine to two months (DI (SBA) et al., 2004; 2007; 2010). Their collective 
agreement thus has one of the lowest thresholds regarding access to an occupa-
tional pension scheme compared to other collective agreements within industrial 
FAOS Research paper 141  
   
52 
cleaning sector and the rest of the Danish labour market (see appendix A and 
B).  
SBA and its counterparts 3F and Serviceforbundet have also improved em-
ployees’ rights and access to further training on several occasions, implicitly 
improving atypical workers’ access to such social benefits. In 2007, they agreed 
to add a new chapter on further training to their collective agreement; employ-
ees with nine months’ employment record were granted rights to two weeks 
further training, and employees with six months’ employment record received 
rights to develop a plan for educational attainment. Part of this chapter on fur-
ther training from 2007 included new rights for employees to improve and as-
sess their qualifications with a particular emphasis on improving their math, 
reading and writing skills (DI (SBA) et al., 2007). During the 2014 bargaining 
round, SBA and its counterparts 3F and Serviceforbundet not only decided to 
lower the threshold for access to further training from nine to six months, but 
also agreed that employees with six months’ employment have the right to take 
two paid hours off to seek guidance from the unions if dismissed. Part of the 
compromise was also that employers have to pay €0.007 per working hour to 
strengthen employees’ further training possibilities (DI (SBA) et al., 2014).  
Most responses regarding lowering the thresholds, including the new social 
rights, have been initiated by the unions and then negotiated with and agreed to 
by the employers. However, some union and employer initiatives have also 
failed repeatedly, such as the unions’ proposal to increase part-time workers’ 
working week and employers’ calls for ways to limit the number of cleaning 
jobs that an employee can hold. Although both sides of the industry share a 
common interest in solving the issue, it remains unsettled, mainly because trade 
unions are unwilling to address the number of jobs part-time workers can hold 
unless employers are willing to guarantee part-time workers more hours. An-
other failed attempt by the unions concerns their proposal for a sector-specific 
wage supplement which would allow industrial cleaners to transfer their ac-
crued rights to wage supplements to other companies within industrial cleaning. 
The unions brought this idea to the negotiation table in 2012 and 2014, but it 
was opposed by the employers.  
With respect to other collective agreements, the unions have been less suc-
cessful when it comes to lowering the threshold for accrued social rights, yet in 
other collective agreements, unions have found limited need to lower the 
threshold as most employees work full-time in their field. The latter applies to, 
for example, the unions representing window cleaners. In addition, KRIFA has 
repeatedly tried to remove or lower the threshold for accruing rights to social 
benefits in their collective agreements with Kristelig Arbejdsgiverforening; 
most recently during their 2010 negotiations, when the employers found no 
need to address the issue. As a result, the threshold for accruing social rights is 
comparatively higher than the rest of the industrial cleaning sector and the Dan-
ish labour market. However, for its upcoming collective bargaining round in 
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autumn 2014, KRIFA will once again try to get the issue of lowering the 
threshold on the agenda – an issue that its counterpart Kristelig Arbejdsgiver-
forening so far has accepted. 
Call temps  
Fixed-term workers with very short-term contracts – so-called call temps – con-
tinue to be a key concern of unions and employers. This group faces an in-
creased risk of precariousness; they have no guaranteed weekly hours and suffer 
from low levels of job security, making it difficult to maintain a reasonable 
living standard. For these reasons, unions have proposed initiatives to improve 
fixed-term workers’ wages and working conditions. By contrast, employers 
seem to embrace this type of employment, as it represents a form of highly flex-
ible labour.  
During their collective bargaining round in 2010, SBA, 3F and Servicefor-
bundet agreed to improve the job security of fixed-term workers with very 
short-term contracts by guaranteeing them a right to a permanent position after 
six months’ employment and rights to accrue social benefits from the first day 
of work – rights that their colleagues in similar fixed-term positions but covered 
by other collective agreements, including in the public sector, do not have. Re-
portedly, the private employers agreed to such a guarantee owing to a recent 
court ruling which deemed their past usage of such fixed-term workers illegal. 
Indeed, the court ruling may have paved the way for the new regulation for 
fixed-term workers in the private sector, as the employers needed to find a 
compromise because they needed fixed-term workers to cover their acute needs 
when they arise.  
Since then the social partners have repeatedly tested the interpretation of 
these rules and regulations; unions interpret them strictly whilst the employers 
call for a softer interpretation and, during the 2014 bargaining round, the em-
ployers unsuccessfully proposed removing fixed-term workers’ rights to a guar-
anteed job offer after six months’ employment. 
Subcontractors and temporary agency work – reducing social dumping  
A series of media reports about the industrial cleaning sector pointing out sub-
contractors, including TWAs, exploiting their staff by offering them wages and 
working conditions far below Danish standards have triggered joint and indi-
vidual responses by trade unions and employers’ associations in recent years. In 
2007, social partners agreed to include a protocol regarding subcontractors with 
the aim of preventing unfair competition and social dumping by companies, 
including subcontractors and TWAs that offer lower wages and working condi-
tions than the standards set in the collective agreement (Petersen and Andersen, 
2007). Part of this agreement is that companies using subcontractors cannot 
offer lower levels of social protection and wages than the standards outlined in 
the collective agreements. Moreover, companies covered by the collective 
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agreement also have to inform the unions about their use of subcontractors 
twice a year, whilst unions are obliged not to sign collective agreements that 
have lower standards than the sectoral agreement (Pedersen and Andersen, 
2007: 35; DI (SBA) et al., 2014). Further additions to the protocol were added 
in 2010 when unions and their representatives acquired the right to demand 
information regarding employee wages if suspecting wage dumping; and in 
2012, when social partners agreed that the burden of proof falls on the employer 
if social dumping is suspected (3F, 2012; DI, 2010). 
Besides the joint actions developed by social partners through the collective 
bargaining rounds, individual  private companies, SBA and Danske Service 
have also initiated their own responses to prevent social dumping and unfair 
competition and to improve the image of the industrial cleaning sector – initia-
tives that have been welcomed by the unions. The large private industrial clean-
ing companies no longer use subcontractors, and SBA launched a certification 
scheme – Servicenormen – in 2009, whilst Danske Service just recently decided 
to set up a similar scheme. The certification scheme by SBA includes a wide 
range of standards which concern, among others, whether companies’ subcon-
tractors comply with wages and working conditions of the collective agree-
ments. SBA’s member organisations – the industrial cleaning companies – have 
to comply with these standards in order to be members of SBA. The companies 
are subject to random visitations by an independent authority. So far, eight 
companies have been expelled from SBA, as they were unable to deliver the 
required documentation.  
Within the local government sector, a number of municipalities have also in-
itiated responses in order to avoid social dumping when cleaning contracts are 
subject to compulsory tendering. Indeed, some municipalities have developed 
social clauses which request that private companies comply with the wages and 
working conditions outlined in the collective agreements when they bid on 
cleaning contracts. A recent case brought before the European Court of Justice, 
however, question the legality of such social clauses, as they are considered 
unfair competition (DA, 2014). 
Danish trade unions have also launched various campaigns to prevent social 
dumping and improve wages and working conditions of industrial cleaners. For 
example, 3F recently launched a media campaign with the title ‘dirty cleaning’ 
to uncover social dumping and companies offering lower wages and working 
conditions  to industrial cleaners than those outlined in the collective agree-
ments.  
Raising union density and collective agreement coverage  
In Denmark, the wages and working conditions of employees within industrial 
cleaning are regulated through a number of collective agreements signed at the 
sectoral and company levels and by labour law, as mentioned earlier. The col-
lective agreements by 3F and Serviceforbundet and their respective counterparts 
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SBA and Danish Service cover the majority of industrial cleaners in the private 
sector. Other collective agreements for the private sector typically cover small 
segments of employees, and some are also examples of company-based agree-
ments. In fact, the collective agreement by SBA and its counterparts 3F and 
Serviceforbundet is in many respects the leading collective agreement for indus-
trial cleaning in the private sector. In the public sector, the main collective 
agreements are signed by the KL, Danske Regioner and the Ministry of Finance 
and their counterparts 3F, Serviceforbundet and FOA.  
Whilst the collective agreements cover the majority of industrial cleaners in 
the sector, union density and the number of organised employers are somewhat 
lower, as mentioned earlier. In the private industrial cleaning sector, social part-
ners have a long tradition of developing joint initiatives to raise union density 
and strengthening the collective bargaining model. SBA and its trade union 
counterparts have a tradition of allowing companies to include measures which 
enable unions to (1) control companies’ use of  fixed-term contracts and mar-
ginal part-time work and (2) raise union density as unions are guaranteed access 
to information on all new employees in order to inform them about the union 
and offer them union membership. Part of this scheme is that employers are 
obliged to send the unions a list of all new employees with more than 15 weekly 
hours and two months’ employment record on a monthly basis. Companies are 
also obliged to deduct the trade union fees automatically from union members’ 
pay slip (DI (SBA) et al., 2014).  
During the collective bargaining rounds in 2010 and 2014, SBA, 3F and 
Serviceforbundet agreed to further strengthen the Danish bargaining model at 
the company level. In 2010, they agreed to a protocol where they jointly would 
promote the election of shop stewards in cleaning companies without union 
representatives and emphasise the advantages of close and formal collaboration 
between management and shop stewards at the company level. In 2014, the 
social partners agreed to set up the collaboration committee ‘Samarbejdsfond’, 
which aims to strengthen and expand the organised labour market within indus-
trial cleaning by (1) strengthening the relations between social partners at the 
company level, (2) supporting further training at the company level and (3) 
contributing to activities to address the various challenges related to outsourcing 
(DI (SBA) et al., 2014).  
Besides their joint activities, trade unions and employers’ associations have 
also launched their own initiatives to increase their membership base and the 
collective agreement coverage. For example, 3F has launched campaigns where 
they invite potential new members to have their pay slip reviewed to ensure 
they get the wage supplements and other social benefits they are entitled to ac-
cording to the collective agreements. However, recruiting new members is re-
portedly an uphill struggle, mainly because the employees often work odd hours 
and individually at different workplaces – typically at the customers’ premises, 
where access depends on acceptance not only by the employer but also by the 
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customer. The employers also have initiated responses to raise the collective 
agreement coverage. For example, Danske Service recently commissioned a 
survey to identify the challenges facing industrial cleaning companies in order 
to target its services to the needs of potential member organisations. 
 
5.4 Summary  
The Danish industrial cleaning sector differs from the rest of the Danish labour 
market in many respects. Women, migrant workers, unskilled workers and atyp-
ical workers are overrepresented compared to the rest of the labour market. 
Self-employed without employees and part-time work, including marginal part-
time employment, are employment types commonly used throughout the indus-
trial cleaning sector whilst flexi-jobs and other public-funded employment 
schemes are found mainly within the public sector. Temps and fixed-term con-
tracts are less widespread within the sector and tend mainly to be used when 
acute needs arise, and such employees are often recruited on a day-to-day basis. 
Subcontractors – although a slightly different category of atypical work from 
the aforementioned – are also frequently used within the sector, although less so 
than just a few years back. They can be TWAs, small or medium-sized compa-
nies or self-employed without employees.  
Some groups appear to be at a greater risk of precariousness than others re-
garding parameters such as wages, social benefits, working time and job and 
employment security. Relatively many part-time workers have few weekly 
hours and tend to work double shifts in a low-paid job to ensure a reasonable 
income, indicating that they face a greater risk of precariousness than their peers 
in full-time permanent positions. Likewise, fixed-term workers and temps, par-
ticularly those with very short-term contracts, also seem to be at increased risk 
of becoming precarious. Unlike their colleagues in permanent part-time posi-
tions, they also have great difficulties in accessing the social benefits outlined in 
the collective agreements and the labour law, as they rarely are able to meet the 
assessment criteria, although the labour law and the collective agreements in 
principle ensure them similar rights as comparable employees in full-time per-
manent positions. In addition, the self-employed without employees, particular-
ly bogus self-employed, face similar risks of becoming precarious, mainly be-
cause many are without legal protection, as neither the collective agreements 
nor the labour law cover these groups since they often are considered company 
owners and not employees.  
Improving and ensuring reasonable wages and working conditions of atypi-
cal workers have been on the bargaining agenda of social partners within the 
sector. It is particularly fixed-term workers with very short contracts, temps, 
subcontractors and the bogus self-employed that have attracted the attention of 
social partners, although for different reasons. The unions and the employers’ 
associations have jointly and individually developed different initiatives with 
some success. They include (1) lowering the thresholds for accruing rights to 
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social benefits along with new social rights to, for example, further training, (2) 
implementing new regulations for subcontractors to prevent social dumping and 
unfair competition, (3) improving the working conditions of fixed-term workers 
recruited for very short periods and (4) raising union density and collective 
agreement coverage.  
The unions have typically proposed responses and then negotiated with the 
employers, who have agreed to them. However, the employers have also initiat-
ed responses with some success. These include a certification scheme to prevent 
social dumping and unfair competition and improve wages and working condi-
tions within industrial cleaning – an initiative that has been entirely employer 
led but welcomed by the unions. Likewise, a number of municipalities has also 
initiated responses to avoid social dumping when cleaning contracts are subject 
to compulsory tendering. They include, for example, the development of social 
clauses that request that private companies comply with the wages and working 
conditions outlined in the collective agreements when they bid on cleaning con-
tracts. Some attempts by social partners to improve the working conditions of 
atypical workers have also failed for various reasons. 
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6. The construction sector  
 
Studies and statistics on different employment types in the Danish construction 
sector are few, and the social partners’ overview of the extent of the different 
employment types is limited. However, the growing number of Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) workers in the sector has attracted lots of attention 
from the government as well as from the social partners and has spun a number 
of studies. Hence, more information is available about CEE workers than the 
other employment groups within the construction sector. Reflecting this situa-
tion, this chapter will focus more on CEE workers than the share of this group 
in the construction sector justifies. The chapter owes a lot to labour migration 
studies conducted by colleagues from our research centre, FAOS: Søren Kaj 
Andersen, Jens Arnholtz, Jonas Felbo-Kolding and Nana Wesley Hansen
6
.  
The structure of sections 6.2 and 6.3 will be so that the overall picture is de-
scribed and analysed in the beginning of the section, followed by a description 
and analysis of the CEE workers.  
 
6.1 Introduction to the sector  
In terms of industrial structure, the Danish construction sector is characterized 
by many micro-companies with less than 10 employees. Thirty-four percent of 
the turnover is produced by firms with zero to nine employees, which is a high-
er share than in North European countries, such as Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands. Only 17 percent of the turnover is made by firms with more than 
250 employees, and the share is decreasing (Energistyrelsen, 2013).  
In 2013, the construction sector employed 152,000 persons (including self-
employed without employees), according to Statistics Denmark, equal to 5.7 
percent of all employees in Denmark.  
The social partner organisations and their members  
The most important social partner organisations in the construction sector are as 
follows:  
 
 The Danish Construction Association (Dansk Byggeri), which devel-
oped as a result of a merger between the federation of Danish Building 
Employers and the Danish Contractors’ Association in 2003. Approxi-
mately 6,000 companies are members, and they employ 70,000 workers 
within the Danish building and construction sector. The member com-
panies are both major building contractors and small and medium-sized 
construction companies as well as manufacturers of building compo-
nents. The companies are involved in a range of core activities, from in-
frastructure and turnkey projects to contractor work specializing in 
                                                     
6 Thanks to Jens Arnholtz, FAOS, for useful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.  
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bricklaying, carpentry and roofing, as well as manufacturing building 
components, such as doors and windows (www.danskbyggeri.dk). 
 Danish Painting Masters (Danske Malermestre) is an employers’ asso-
ciation established in 1900. It has 1,500 members. Danish Master Paint-
ers is members of the Danish Confederation of Employers (DA).  
 Danish Crafts (Dansk Håndværk) is an employers’ association for small 
and medium-sized companies (SMEs) within the woodworking and 
furniture industry and construction, and for small carpenters and joiners 
and a number of other craft-based industries in Denmark. 
 3F (United Federation of Danish Workers) Construction Group is one 
of the largest unions in Denmark, a general workers union which covers 
employees in both the private and the public sector. The construction 
group has 67,000 members and was established in 2011 when Træ-
Industri-Byg (TIB), which organised carpenters, joiners and a number 
of other occupations in the construction sector, was merged into 3F. 3F 
Construction Group is now the main trade union unit in the construction 
sector.  
 The Painters Union (Malerforbundet) organises painters and is the sec-
ond-largest union in the construction sector. 
 The BAT cartel (Bygge-, Anlæg og Transportkartellet) is a cooperation 
unit for seven different trade unions which fully or partly operate in the 
construction sector.  
 
There are no official statistics on the membership of the social partner organisa-
tions in the construction industry. However, a large-scale survey from 2013 of 
companies with more than five employees (Andersen and Felbo-Kolding, 
2013b) gives some indications. According to the survey, no less than 88 percent 
of employees work in a construction firm with a collective agreement, and the 
same number, 88 percent, are covered by a collective agreement. Another sur-
vey, from 2010, indicates an organisational density on the employers’ side of 80 
percent and collective agreement coverage of 83 percent (Larsen et al., 2010). 
All members of the Danish Construction Association are by definition covered 
by a collective agreement, but additionally a large number of non-member firms 
are covered by adoption agreements (‘tiltrædelsesoverenskomster’). Neither 
study includes data sufficient to estimate organisational density on the trade 
union side, but both indicate that well above half of employees are union mem-
bers. A register-based study from 2010 reported trade union density in construc-
tion to have declined from 81 to 73 percent in the period 1994–2008 
(AE/FAOS, 2010). 
The Danish Construction Association has six collective agreements with 3F 
related to construction in the private sector, but the one with the widest cover-
age by far in terms of employees is ‘the construction agreement’ (bygge- og 
anlægsoverenskomsten). It is also the one which will be focused on below. Dan-
ish Crafts and Danish Painting Masters also have one collective agreement each 
with 3F.  
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6.2 Wages conditions for different employment types  
Employment types and employment conditions  
A study conducted by the largest Danish trade union confederation, LO, in 2011 
found the construction sector to be the sector with the second-largest use of 
‘atypical’ employees – defined in the study as fixed-term employees, temps and 
self-employed. However, the figures may not be very accurate, since the con-
struction sector and retail have been merged into one category. We will try to be 
a bit more accurate in what follows. 
Regarding employment types, full-time open-ended contracts dominate the 
picture in the construction sector (see table 5.1.). There are basically two types 
of full-time employees: those who stay with the same employer for longer peri-
ods, typically on open-ended contracts, and the teams (‘sjak’) who work for 
different employers in order to get the best possible salary (often on piecework 
wage systems), typically on fixed-term contracts. However, the difference in 
terms of job security when employed on an open-ended contract vis-à-vis a 
fixed-term contract is not necessarily substantial in the Danish construction 
sector, since the notice period in the construction sector is among the shortest
7 
in the Danish labour market, the administrative barriers are few and remunera-
tion pay is not used.  
Whilst 14 percent of the employees work part-time (including self-
employed), the extent of (marginal) part-time work is unknown but is estimated 
to be a relatively limited phenomenon.  
 
Table 6.1: Employees in construction by three employment types, 2009–2013 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Full-time 129,000 112,000 108,000 115,000 114,000 
Part-time  28,000 25,000 24,000 21,000 21,000 
Self-employed 20,000 19,000 18,000 17,000 17,000 
Total 177,000 159,000 150,000 153,000 152,000 
Source: Statistics Denmark(RASOFF33; ATR32).  
 
Regarding TAW, it has not been possible to get high-quality statistics on the 
extent of this group in construction. Recent figures from Statistic Denmark 
show that the relative share of temps (measured in working hours) in the catego-
ry ‘production and construction’ relative to all temps in all sectors increased 
from 20 percent in 2009 to 34 percent in 2012, after a downturn from 24 percent 
in 2007 before the crisis to 20 percent in 2009 (Statistikbanken PRDST714). 
However, the figures are possibly not very accurate. Firstly, they include not 
only construction but also the manufacturing industry. Secondly, they show the 
relative and not actual development. And since the use of temps decreased in 
                                                     
7 The employers’ terms of notice are as follows: 0–1 years of employment = 0 week, 1–2 years = 3 weeks, 3–5 
years = 5 weeks, more than 5 years = 7 weeks (Dansk Byggeri and 3F, 2014).  
 
FAOS Research paper 141  
   
61 
the category where the use was most widespread until a few years ago (‘health 
care’), the relative use of temps may have increased for this reason alone.  
The use of temps in construction shows both cyclical and structural devel-
opments. Prior to the late 1990s, TAW was limited in the construction sector. 
Sources within the TAW sector estimated that 1 percent of the work tasks were 
performed by temps in 1996 compared to 6–7 percent in 2002 (Byggecentrum, 
November 20, 2002).  
Self-employed is a relative large group of the workforce in the construction 
sector, as can be seen in both tables 6.1 and 6.2. Because the self-employed are 
not employees, they are not entitled to benefits on the same level as the employ-
ees and the workload can be intensive. Most attention has been given to the 
problem of bogus self-employed (‘falske selvstændige’), who are de facto em-
ployees but are registered as self-employed so their employer avoids paying 
social benefits, occupational pensions included. It is difficult to estimate how 
many of the currently 17,000 self-employed without employees are bogus self-
employed since there is not a clear definition of the category. The Danish trade 
unions’ concern about the bogus self-employed is not new but has intensified 
with the EU enlargements because of fear that a large number of low-paid bo-
gus self-employed from the new member states would enter Denmark (Hansen 
and Andersen, 2008).  
 
Table 6.2: Employees by employment type in the construction sector, 2007–13 
 2007 2010 2013 
Full-time 150,000 118,000 111,000 
Part-time  
- Marginal part-time* 
9,000 
3,000 
6,000 
2,000 
6,000 
3,000 
Fixed-term 18,000 17,000 15,000 
Open ended 141,000 118,000 103,000 
TAW 3,000 n.a. n.a. 
Self-employed,  
no employees 
17,000 17,000 17,000 
Source: Statistics Denmark, tailored calculation, AKU. * = 15 hours or below, de facto working 
hours.  
 
To get a bit more accurate figures on all the selected employment types, we 
asked Statistics Denmark to create a tailored calculation on employment types. 
The result is shown in table 6.2. The table adds to our knowledge about the 
sector in at least four ways. Firstly, the number of temps is not high in construc-
tion, either in absolute terms or relative to other employment types in the sector. 
The table also confirms that the numbers of temps have declined since the eco-
nomic crisis – actually to below 2,000 (Statistics Denmark does not show num-
bers below 2,000). Secondly, marginal part-time work is limited but still makes 
up a third of all part-time positions. Thirdly, although the use of fixed-term 
contracts could be expected to be higher considering the presence of teams, they 
nevertheless make up around 10 percent of the employees. Fourthly, although 
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the number of employees on employment contracts with the highest risk of pre-
cariousness is not increasing, their relative share is increasing. It seems that it 
has been mostly open-ended contract jobs that have disappeared since the crisis. 
However, the table does not indicate a dramatic development towards a more 
precarious construction labour market. It should be noted that posted workers 
(including temps from foreign companies) do not figure in the table, and these 
might one of the groups with the highest risk of precariousness.  
Labour migrants – Central and Eastern European workers 
As mentioned above, CEE workers is the group of employees which has re-
ceived the most attention in the construction sector. There are basically four 
types of CEE workers in the construction sector: (1) workers directly employed 
by an Danish employer, (2) workers employed in a Danish TWA but hired by a 
Danish construction firm, (3) posted CEE workers employed in a foreign firm 
which operates as a subcontractor or a TWA in the Danish construction sector 
and (4) self-employed CEE, including those who take advantage of the possibil-
ity to set up one-man companies in other countries (Hansen and Andersen, 
2008).  
So why do construction sector employers employ CEE workers? According 
to a survey of Danish construction companies from 2007, the five most-often 
mentioned advantages when using CEE workers are ‘they are in supply’, ‘will-
ing to take on the tasks asked for’, ‘greater working time flexibility’, ‘greater 
functional flexibility’ and ‘cheaper’ – where the cost-related issue was ranked 
only as number five. By far the most common drawback when using CEE 
workers was ‘communication problems’, followed by ‘lack of knowledge re-
garding standards and security rules’, ‘more time and resources required for 
introduction to work tasks’, ‘working slower than Danes’ and ‘problems with 
accommodation’ (Hansen and Andersen, 2008). 
A combined survey/register-based study from 2012 showed that it is actually 
a surprisingly small number of CEE workers (EU-10) that work in the Danish 
construction sector, considering the attention given to them – only 2,300, equal 
to some 2 percent of all employees in the construction sector. However, the 
construction sector is also the sector with the highest share of posted workers by 
far. The figure for posted workers (not only CEE workers) in construction 
stands around 7,000 and helps to justify the substantial attention given to CEE 
construction workers in Denmark. Furthermore, the survey showed that 8 per-
cent of construction companies use CEE workers of one type or another and that 
21 percent of CEE workers in Denmark work within construction (Andersen 
and Felbo-Kolding, 2013).  
Poles are by far the largest group of CEE workers in construction. According 
to a survey, the construction sector employs 44 percent of all Polish men and 2 
percent of all Polish women working in Denmark. For the manufacturing indus-
try, the percentages are 17/10, low-skilled service (cleaning etc.) 30/74 and 
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others 9/13 (Hansen and Hansen, 2009). The two surveys also point to a number 
of other features of Polish construction workers in the Greater Copenhagen 
area. For example, although open-ended contracts are common, the majority of 
Polish migrant workers have some kind of atypical work arrangement, including 
work through Polish subcontractors and TWAs. There is a significant market 
for construction services for private households, and there is also a significant 
market for undeclared informal work. Another interesting finding was that very 
few Poles in the Danish construction sector are reported to speak Danish at 
work. When compared with other sectors, there are significant differences in the 
extent to which the migrants rely on communicating in Polish, English or the 
host-country language. In the construction industry, more than half speak only 
Polish at work, indicating highly segregated work organisations.  
 
Table 6.3: Type of employment in construction in Copenhagen, share of all    
Polish workers in percentages 
Type of 
employment 
Permanent 
employment 
in host-land 
firm  
Temporary 
employment 
in host-land 
firm 
TWA  Employment 
in foreign 
company  
Self-
employed 
without 
employees 
Share 
 
34 16 1 32 17 
Source: Friberg and Eldring (2013). 
Wages and working conditions for different employment types 
Basically, there are two wage systems in the Danish construction sector with 
regard to manual workers. One is an hourly paid wage system, the other a (per-
formance-related) piecework system. An important feature of the hourly system 
is the difference between the minimum and the average wage. In 2012, the min-
imum wage
8
 for manual workers was approximately €15 per hour, whereas the 
average wage was approximately €26 per hour (Dansk Byggeri, 2013). The 
difference indicates that the construction firms pay a substantial amount of ex-
tras for qualification etc. after local negotiations. This difference between min-
imum and average wages has become a matter of controversy. The trade unions 
interpret the collective agreements so that extras should be paid in all cases, 
whereas the employers view the relatively low minimum wage as an opportuni-
ty to pay migrant workers less than Danish workers in a way that respects the 
collective agreements (see below).  
Statistics and studies of the wages and wage setting in the construction sec-
tor are rare, but a survey from 2006 (Stamhus, 2007) covering the construction 
sector, among others, shows some important features:  
 
                                                     
8 The minimum wage referred to here is the so-called ‘mindsteløn’ and not ‘minimalløn’. ‘Mindsteløn’ is 
more individual based, with individual bargaining on extras at the firm level. Compared with the average 
wage, the minimum wage is low in the ‘mindstebetalingslønsystem’.  
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 Regarding wage systems, 45 percent of the male manual workers (the 
large majority) worked in an hourly wage system, 9 percent in a piece-
work system and 47 percent in a combination of the two. For the female 
manual workers (the small minority), the numbers were 35 percent, 11 
percent and 54 percent.  
 10 percent of the companies paid only the minimum wage to all or 
some of their employees (Stamhus, 2007).  
 
The survey also included a number of features regarding voice:  
 
 66 percent of the companies in the construction sector answered that 
they practiced some form of wage negotiation. Asked about manual 
workers specifically, 4 percent answered that they had no employees of 
this type, whilst 9 percent had no wage negotiations with them, 31 per-
cent individual negotiations and 56 percent collective negotiations.  
 79 percent of the companies had a collective agreement for manual 
workers.  
 
It has not been possible to get information on wages for different employment 
types.  
Regarding working time, recent figures suggest that the number of average 
weekly hours for full-time employees is 39 hours, and this number has been 
relatively unchanged since 2006 (Statistics Denmark, AKU503). The normal 
working week according to the collective agreements is 37 hours. Information 
about working time for the different employment types has not been found.  
Wages and working conditions for CEE workers in construction 
Across the employment categories, manual jobs in the construction sector are 
relatively well paid, and piecework (performance-related) wage systems are as 
widespread as hourly wages. The relatively high average wages reflect, among 
other things, that the majority of employees are skilled (three-and-a-half-year 
dual apprenticeship-education). 
According to the aforementioned 2008 survey (Hansen & Hansen (2008),   
covering only the largest group of CEE workers, Poles, and only the Greater 
Copenhagen region), the average wage difference within sectors with a high 
concentration of Poles was highest in the construction sector. Here the average 
wage of Poles was approximately €16.00 per hour, whereas it was €21.80 per 
hour for Danes. The minimum wage at that time was approximately €14.00  per 
hour (Hansen and Hansen, 2008; Friberg and Eldring, 2013: 99). 
A survey by Hansen and Andersen (2008) covering all employees in the Danish 
labour market published the same year also shows substantial wage differences 
(see table 6.4). A more recent survey confirms this picture. The companies in 
this survey reported that the average wage for CEE workers was €18.50 per 
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hour, whereas for Danes it was €22.10 per hour (Andersen and Felbo-Kolding, 
2013: 156).  
 
Table 6.4: Hourly wages for CEE workers and Danish workers in the construc-
tion industry, €/hour, 2007 
Euros 13–15  15–17  17–19  19–21  21+  
CEE workers 43%  23%  20%  11%  3%  
Danish workers 5% 12% 29% 31% 23% 
Source: Hansen and Andersen (2008). 
 
Regarding working time, there is no doubt that many CEE workers work long 
hours, much more than the sector average of 39 hours per week. Hansen and 
Andersen (2008) reported that 39 percent of employed CEE workers worked 
less than 38 hours, 51 percent between 38 and 50 hours and 10 percent more 
than 51 hours. For posted CEE workers, the corresponding percentages were 15, 
62 and 23.  
 
6.3 Social partners’ approaches to atypical work in the sector 
Initiatives related to the various employment types  
Few social partner initiatives have explicitly addressed these employment types. 
An important development has been social partners’ decision to gradually lower 
seniority threshold for accruing rights to the social benefits outlined in the col-
lective agreement by the Association of Danish Construction and 3F. This 
change has been of great importance to fixed-term employees, temps and em-
ployees on open-ended contracts as this has eased their access to social benefits 
regulated through collective agreements. The threshold for accessing some so-
cial rights has been lowered, but the most important step was taken in the col-
lective bargaining round in 2010, when the threshold for pensions was lowered 
from 9 to 2 months of employment in accordance with an initiative in the trend-
setting collective agreement of the manufacturing industry. This implies that 
after only two months of employment, the employee has rights to accrue occu-
pational pensions, whereas the right to full-paid sick leave requires 3 months of 
employment, and paid maternity/paternity leave 6 months (Dansk Byggeri and 
3F, 2013, see appendix C). Although not explicitly linked to CEE workers, this 
decision also affected this group of workers, mainly because it reduced employ-
ers’ incentives to speculate in recruiting employees for very short periods to 
avoid what is known internationally as ‘social contributions’.  
Social partner initiatives related to CEE workers
9
 
Labour migration initiatives are far more numerous than those linked to the 
selected employment types. It is important to emphasise that although the fol-
lowing initiatives target CEE workers, some of them might also have an indirect 
                                                     
9 Unless otherwise noted, the source of this and the two following sections is Andersen and Arnholtz (2013).  
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impact in improving the wages and conditions of non-CEE workers because 
they ‘lift the bottom of the sector’, so to speak. 
The social partners have managed to agree on a number of initiatives to im-
prove the wages and working conditions for CEE-workers and to avoid social 
dumping, i.e., unfair competition. The main driver here has not been concern for 
the well-being of the CEE workers. Instead, the trade unions’ main driver has 
been fear of (unfair) wage competition, whereas the employers’ interest has 
mainly concerned unfair competition. However, different types of construction 
employers have clearly different interests here, and for some, the advantages of 
cheap CEE workers are greater than the competition pressure. This is also part 
of the reason why the Danish Construction Association sometimes agrees with 
the trade unions on initiatives to limit social dumping, and sometimes does not.  
It is important to note that no extension mechanism of collective agreements 
exists in the construction sector or anywhere else in the Danish labour market.  
It was the collective bargaining rounds in 2007 and 2010 especially which 
included initiatives by social partners regarding CEE workers. The 2007 agree-
ment included the possibility to call for so-called accommodating bargaining 
(‘tilpasningsforhandlinger’) between trade union officials/shop stewards and the 
Danish Construction Association in the case of reasonable suspicion that a for-
eign-owned company did not follow the collective agreement. These talks were 
followed up in the 2010 agreement with the so-called 48-hour meetings, which 
oblige the social partners to set up a meeting within 48 hours if there is a belief 
that a violation of the collective agreements has taken place. Moreover, it is 
now up to the employer to prove compliance with the collective agreement, and 
not the trade unions to prove a violation. Hence, the demand for setting up a 
meeting was softened.  
The 48-hour meeting is seen by the trade unions as an important tool in their 
fight against social dumping, which is also recognised by the employers. How-
ever, the employers find that 3F calls for too many meetings, as some of the 
reasons for the meetings are considered irrelevant  by the employers (Andersen 
and Arnholtz, 2014).  
The 2007 collective bargaining round also saw the set-up of a special vaca-
tion and bank holiday fund to handle the payment of holiday allowances for all 
employees covered by the construction sector collective agreement, including 
posted workers and other CEE workers. Moreover, a discussion took place in 
relation to an issue raised by the trade unions, which reported several examples 
where employers reduced CEE workers’ wages for the reason that the employ-
ers provided them with transport and accommodation.  In 2007, a code of con-
duct was added to the collective agreement for the manufacturing industry and 
stipulated that it should be voluntary for foreign workers to be included in such 
arrangements regarding transport and accommodation. The construction sector 
added a similar code of conduct in 2010.  
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There are also examples of failed initiatives. For example, during the most 
recent bargaining rounds in 2012 and 2014, the social partners failed to agree on 
an extension of the so-called piecework absence extra (‘akkordafsavnstillæg’), 
which in some circumstances is paid to workers not working on the lucrative 
piecework pay system. In 2012, 3F proposed to extend this type of wage sup-
plement to all employees in the construction sector. CEE workers are typically 
not covered by the piecework pay system and seldom take part in local wage 
negotiations. Thus, the proposal was aimed at raising the minimum wage level 
for these workers. However, the proposal was rejected by the Danish Construc-
tion Association. Moreover, 3F also proposed to include a principle of chain 
liability in the collective agreement, but this initiative was also opposed by the 
employers.  
In 2014, 3F repeated the proposals for piecework absence extra and chain li-
ability on the bargaining agenda, but again without success. Instead, the social 
partners agreed to add an appendix to the collective agreement stating that ‘the 
minimum wages should be added to’ when wages were agreed and that this 
should be done in accordance with seniority, qualifications etc. It was added 
that if the parties could not agree, the legal institutions should take over. In real-
ity, this was not much more than an agreement to disagree and a method to set-
tle disputes (Andersen and Ibsen, 2014). Underneath the agreement is a disa-
greement regarding how the wage system within the construction sector should 
be used. The employers’ association wants to use the full flexibility of the sec-
tor wage agreements by allowing firms to pay only the minimum wage or 
slightly above it when they find it appropriate. The trade unions on the other 
hand see this behaviour as not in accordance with the spirit of the minimum 
wage system, which should acknowledge different aspects of the work task and 
the employees’ qualifications and competences.  
Tripartite initiatives related to CEE workers  
The collective agreements are only one arena where the challenges caused by 
rising numbers of CEE workers are addressed. Various forms of tripartite ar-
rangements also constitute an important arena to discuss these matters (Mailand, 
2008). The foundation for this arena was created by the Danish transitional 
agreements for the new EU member states, which gradually were phased out by 
2009. In relation to these agreements, a formal working group was set up with 
participation of five ministries, various public authorities (among them, the 
national police and the labour inspectorate) and the trade union and employers 
confederations. In addition, a smaller informal working group was set up with 
the participation of the Ministry of Employment, LO and DA and meets biannu-
ally. The working group discusses issues related not only to CEE workers but to 
labour migration in general.  
One of the results of the working group’s efforts was the set-up of the so-
called RUT register in 2010, where all foreign posted workers and self-
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employed are obliged to sign up. This is a tool for the trade unions and others to 
fight social dumping and a tool for the government tax authorities. The working 
group has also been instrumental in initiatives to extend the use of working 
clauses to respect Danish wages and working conditions in state-financed con-
struction projects and in initiatives to counteract non-compliance with the rules 
for foreign transport companies operating in Denmark.  
Another tax-related initiative is also worth mentioning, although it was not a 
result of tripartite consensus in that the employers’ organisations opposed it 
from the beginning. The introduction of the so-called subcontractors’ employee 
tax (‘arbejdsudlejeskat’) in 2012 tightened the rules for tax-paying for foreign 
companies and their employees/subcontractors to ensure that they pay taxes in 
Denmark at a level of a little more than one-third of their income. The initiative 
was to prevent social dumping and targeted CEE workers/companies. However, 
the initiative ran into several problems. One of them was that highly educated 
specialists within IT and other branches also were covered. For that reason the 
regulation was changed to the approval of Danish employers’ organisations as 
well. Moreover, the German and Polish governments have criticised Denmark 
for limiting the free movement of services with the initiative and have com-
plained to the European Commission. Among the problems are that the employ-
ees covered risk paying taxes in both their home and the host country (Den-
mark). It remains unclear whether the Danish government will be forced to 
change the rule again or fully dismiss it (business.dk, March 13, 2014).  
The German and Polish reactions illustrate some more general problems 
with 3Fs and other actors’ attempts to counteract social dumping, which are that 
the initiatives in some cases may conflict with European regulation and risk 
creating an atmosphere where CEE workers do not feel welcome in Denmark.  
Trade unions’ attempts to organise CEE workers 
Whilst the construction sector trade unions, as described above, have succeeded 
in getting social dumping introduced in the collective bargain arena as well as in 
the tripartite arena, attempts to organise the CEE workers have been less suc-
cessful. 3F and the BAT cartel have formulated a dual strategy which is reflect-
ed above in two parts – a primary industrial relations strategy focused on organ-
ising and covering the work by collective agreements and a secondary political 
strategy. Furthermore, the BAT cartel has emphasised that in the long run, it 
will be possible to win the fight against social dumping only by winning the 
CEE workers by ‘love and good arguments’ and that the local branches of the 
3F and the then-existing TIB was central in reaching this goal. However, a 
study of Polish workers in the Greater Copenhagen region showed that 73 per-
cent of the local departments answered that they had not been allocated any 
resources in relation to CEE worker initiatives, and only 3 percent had officials 
working only on initiatives in relation to CEE workers (Hansen and Hansen, 
2009). Several of the branches reported that CEE workers got in touch with the 
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unions only when they had experienced problems with their employers. Moreo-
ver, they experienced that those CEE workers who actually became trade union 
members often relinquished their membership by not paying the second instal-
ment. However, since 63 percent of the Polish non-members in the survey an-
swered that they would have had fewer problems if they had been union mem-
bers, there still seems to be potential for extending trade union membership 
among CEE workers.  
A comparative study of Danish, Norwegian and British unions’ effort to or-
ganise CEE workers can illuminate some of the reasons for the problem of low 
union membership (Eldring and Friberg, 2013). The study showed that Norwe-
gian construction workers’ unions have been more successful in unionising 
CEE workers than their Danish and British counterparts. This is an interesting 
finding given that Denmark has a higher union density overall and the unions 
have put a lot of resources into recruiting Polish workers, whilst it is less sur-
prising that the weaker UK unions have not achieved similar results, given their 
low union density and fewer resources. Regarding Denmark and Norway, one 
key explanation for how apparently identical frameworks and purported strate-
gies can result in widely different outcomes in terms of recruiting labour immi-
grants can probably be found in the institutional dissimilarities in the two coun-
tries’ traditions of handling industrial conflicts. In the Danish labour market, 
there are more legal opportunities to take industrial action, and historically this 
has resulted in a far higher number of labour conflicts. Denmark and the UK 
also have these disparities. Thus, whilst the Danish unions’ efforts to establish 
collective agreements may have appeared too aggressive in the eyes of migrant 
workers, Norwegian and UK unions’ approach of providing assistance to indi-
viduals may have appeared more convincing, as they are based on solidarity. 
The Danish trade unions are larger and more powerful than their sister organisa-
tions in Norway and the UK and act to a greater extent as monitors and adminis-
trators of the industry, rather than as organisers and activists. The latter role 
may inspire more confidence in the power and usefulness of the unions, where-
as when time and resources are focused on maintaining rules and regulations, 
migrant workers may feel that unions are not there for them. In Norway and the 
UK, resources have been used for local recruitment and developing personal 
contact and strong engagement with migrants. 
 
6.4 Implementing EU regulation – and the role of the social partners  
EU regulation has to some extent influenced the situation of atypical employees 
in the construction sector.  
The temporary agency work directive of 2008, already presented in the chap-
ter on TWAs, was implemented in Denmark in July 2013. In May 2013, the 
legislation on the directive was finally passed by Parliament. To avoid social 
dumping, the principle of non-discrimination principle can be exempted only by 
collective agreements between the most representative social partner organisa-
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tions in Denmark. This prevents non-Danish TWAs from using their own col-
lective agreements as a basis for exemption (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2013). 
However, the trade unions were not pleased with the result, although they 
agreed to it in the Implementation Committee, because it implies that in some 
sector branches, they will be bound to rather old agreements with TWAs that do 
not ensure non-discrimination. It remains to be seen what impact the legislation 
will have in the construction sector.  
Since posting is widespread in the construction sector, the posting of workers 
directive from 1996 is especially relevant for this sector. According to the Eu-
ropean Commission, there were around 20,000 posted workers in Denmark in 
2011  (European Commission, 2014). The directive includes a number of issues 
related to wages and working conditions and declares that the host country can 
require that a foreign company respect the host country’s rules and regulations 
when posting workers.  
Regarding CEE workers, the Laval quartet (the European Court of Justice’s 
rulings in the Laval case, the Rüffert case, the Luxembourg case and the Viking 
case), caused some concern in the Danish government and among the social 
partners. A Danish tripartite working group was established and a consensus 
reached to meet the challenges from the Laval ruling especially, which ques-
tioned the right for trade unions to take industrial action against foreign compa-
nies posting workers in Denmark. The 2009 proposals from the Laval Commit-
tee included a number of changes in collective bargaining and legislation, which 
are of special importance to the construction sector since the majority of posted 
workers are found here. After the Laval ruling, the Danish implementation of 
the directive was changed so as to explicitly stipulate that wage issues are regu-
lated by the social partners through collective bargaining and collective action. 
Another change concerned the calculation of the minimum wage. The commit-
tee’s proposals were by and large respected as guidelines in legislation and col-
lective agreements. The proposals stated that only the national wage level 
should be relevant as a point of reference for companies posting workers (the 
‘national demand’ of the Laval ruling) and that non-wage issues from the col-
lective agreements, such as pensions, extra holiday entitlements etc., should be 
transformed into wage issues via a calculation (the ‘precision demand’ of the 
Laval ruling). However, the Danish Construction Association never acknowl-
edged the calculation. Moreover, the construction company responsible for the 
extension of the Copenhagen Metro, Trevi, has recently challenged the way 3F 
is administrating these new initiatives, as Trevi is pressured into paying pension 
contributions twice.  
The directive on posted workers had long been criticized for not having been 
implemented sufficiently in the member states. For that reason, a process of 
improving the implementation through the enforcement directive linked to the 
original directive was initiated. The European Commission published a proposal 
in 2012, which was finally adopted in May 2014. One of the most important 
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features of the enforcement directive is that it obliges member states to intro-
duce subcontracting liability or other appropriate enforcement measures in the 
construction sector as part of a comprehensive approach to better enforcement. 
The liability is limited to the direct subcontractor (European Commission, 
2014). It is fully up to the member states how they will meet this demand. The 
Danish government’s approach to implementing the enforcement directive re-
garding the subcontracting question is that it will be sufficient if the first chain 
subcontractor is in the RUT register, referring to a two-year-old proposal made 
by LO and the Confederation of Danish Employers (DA). However, the RUT 
register has since been changed, and LO has lost faith in it as a sufficient tool 
against social dumping. The BAT cartel also refused this solution and asked for 
subcontracting liability by law, which the Danish Construction Association 
finds a bad idea. It wants the challenge to be dealt with by collective agreements 
only (Ugebrevet A4, April 15, 2014).  
 
6.5 Summary  
Across employment categories, manual jobs in the construction sector are rela-
tively well paid, and piecework (performance-related) wage systems are as 
widespread as hourly wages. The relatively high average wages reflect, among 
other things, that the majority of employees are skilled (three-and-a-half-year 
dual apprenticeship-education).  
It is difficult to estimate the scale of precariousness in the Danish construct-
ing sector. There is no doubt that there are some pockets within the sector where 
wages and working and employment conditions are far below those of full-time 
employees on open-ended contracts and the standards outlined in the legislation 
and the collective agreements. Different studies have illuminated this as far as 
the various forms of CEE workers are concerned. However, it is very likely that 
the ‘worst’ part of the sector has not been covered in these studies, and hence 
the extent of precariousness is still unknown. Nevertheless, large parts of the 
sector respect the legislation and the collective agreements when employing 
CEE workers.  
The picture is even more unclear when it comes to the various employment 
types in general, although some details are known: Self-employment without 
employees is high (more than 10 percent of all employees) but has remained 
relatively stable. The share of bogus self-employment is unknown but potential-
ly represents a precariousness challenge, both in its Danish and in its CEE form. 
TAW fluctuates with the business cycle, but the number is low and has been 
decreasing since the crisis. Marginal part-time work is limited in numbers but 
makes up around a third of all part-time employment. Full-time work and fixed-
term contracts coexist, but the former is not necessarily more attractive than the 
latter from the employees’ point of view.  
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Reductions in the seniority threshold in the collective agreements have im-
proved atypical employees’ right to social benefits, including occupational pen-
sions, but full equal treatment has not yet been obtained. 
Regarding the social partners’ initiatives to address the problemof precari-
ousness, these have been few regarding employment type but many regarding 
CEE workers. Trade unions and employers have partly overlapping interests in 
restricting some forms of competition from foreign companies and employees. 
Some initiatives have been related to European directives; others have been 
bipartite or tripartite. A common goal of the initiatives is to ensure that the col-
lective agreements are respected and that collective bargaining can continue to 
be the prime mode of regulating wages and conditions in the sector so that more 
legislation and a statutory minimum wage can be avoided despite pressure on 
the collective bargaining–based model.  
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7. Comparison and conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the four sectors will be compared and conclusions drawn. In the 
first section, we will discuss to what extent the employment types within the 
four sectors can be considered precarious. The second section sums up the most 
important trends in the social partners’ responses and the variation between 
these sectors. The third section describes the drivers in the development of pre-
carious employment in the sectors analysed. Finally, the fourth section ends this 
national report with listing a few challenges to be addressed in future initiatives 
related to precariousness.  
 
7.1 Variations in vulnerability  
The four sectors are part of a development, where the forms of atypical included 
in this project overall has been fairly stable over the last 15 years. Some work 
types have increased in number whereas others have decreased. TAW has de-
clined since the economic crisis. Flexi-jobs and marginal part-time employment 
have increased, whilst the number of fixed-term workers and self-employed 
without employees appear to have stagnated. Variations exist across the Danish 
labour market as to which sectors employ these groups of employees. Marginal 
part-time contracts, fixed-term contracts and flexi-jobs are more frequently 
found in the public than in the private sector. However, in the private sector, we 
also find sectors like construction, transport and private services where the 
workforce is increasingly diverse in terms of employment types, but only some 
groups can be considered precarious workers in terms of low wages, low levels 
of social-, employment- and job security and involuntary part-time positions.. 
Variation by sector 
All four of the selected sectors include types of employment for which precari-
ousness is or might be a problem. But the scope and depth of precariousness 
varies greatly between the four sectors, and in one – the hospital sector – it 
seems to be very limited. The four sectors constitute a continuum from the hos-
pital sector, with very limited problems of precariousness, through the construc-
tion sector and TWA sector, with some problems, to industrial cleaning, where 
a larger share of employees face an increased risk of precariousness. The con-
tinuum should be treated with some caution, however, because the project pro-
poses neither a precise definition of precariousness nor a precise way to meas-
ure it.  
Regarding the hospital sector, nurses and other health care and support staff 
analysed generally face few precariousness challenges in wages and employ-
ment and working conditions, whether they are on open-ended full-time con-
tracts or other types of contracts. The use of (external) TAW has been reduced 
to a very low level, and, more importantly, TAW (whether external or internal) 
is nearly exclusively voluntarily, with workers topping up full-time or long part-
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time open-ended contracts. Self-employment is non-existing. However, both 
fixed-term work and marginal part-time work are relatively widespread. In gen-
eral, atypical employees are eligible for pensions, fully paid sick leave and other 
social benefits, but some of the thresholds are still long and longer than in the 
private sector. This is the case for the 10-month threshold for accruing pensions 
for some occupational groups. Wage-subsidy jobs are rising but from a very low 
level. 
In Denmark, jobs in the construction sector are, generally speaking, well 
paid (compared to construction work in most other European countries) and are 
held mostly by skilled manual workers. Self-employment is high (more than 10 
percent of all employees) but has remained relatively stable – the share of bogus 
self-employment is unknown but potentially represents a precariousness chal-
lenge, both in its Danish and in its CEE form. The number of temps fluctuates 
with the business cycle, but the number is relatively low and has decreased 
since the economic crisis. However, the statistics include only TAW from 
TWAs registered in Denmark, and therefore the actual number might be higher. 
Marginal part-time contracts are relatively few but make up around one-third of 
all part-time employment in the sector. Full-time work and fixed-term contracts 
coexist, but the former is not necessarily much more attractive than the latter 
from the employees’ point of view. Full-time positions have decreased since the 
crisis, whilst most other types of employment have been stable, giving the atyp-
ical positions with a greater risk of precariousness more weight in the sector. 
However, the change is not great. The greatest risk of precariousness might be 
faced by CEE workers, of which posted workers are the largest group. Studies 
of this group have illuminated that CEE workers on average are paid less, work 
longer hours, have less access to training, are less frequently members of a trade 
union etc. 
The TAW sector is not really a sector in Denmark, either when it comes to 
industrial structure or in industrial relations terms, where it is split into several 
sector/branch agreements. TAW employment makes up some 0.8 percent of 
total employment. In Denmark, TAW is a fairly recent employment type (not 
legally recognized before 1990) and represents a relatively small segment of the 
Danish labour market which cuts across various sectors and occupations. The 
sectors that use the most temps are now the manufacturing industry and the 
constructing sector, whereas TAW in the health and social care sector declined 
rapidly after the economic crisis. Regulations have been changed gradually 
during the last 10–15 years (mainly by covering TAW under collective agree-
ments) in order to secure equal treatment between temps and other employees. 
However, research shows that temps continue to be at greater risk of precari-
ousness than their peers in full-time permanent positions based on parameters 
such wages, social benefits, working time and job and employment security. It 
is particularly temps with short-term contracts and few weekly hours that face a 
greater risk of precariousness. 
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The Danish industrial cleaning sector differs in many respects from the rest 
of the Danish labour market. The sector is dominated by a workforce where 
women, migrant workers, unskilled workers and atypical workers are overrepre-
sented compared to the rest of the labour market. Indeed, the traditional full-
time permanent position with its 37-plus-hour working week is less widespread 
within the sector. By contrast, self-employment without employees and part-
time work (including marginal part-time) are the employment types commonly 
used throughout the industrial cleaning sector whilst flexi-jobs and other public-
funded employment schemes are found mainly within the public sector. TAW 
and fixed-term contracts are less widespread within the sector and tend to be 
used mainly when acute needs arise, and such employees are often recruited on 
a day-to-day basis. 
Variation by employment type 
If the focus is on types of employment instead of sector, the four sector studies 
do indicate that some of the employment types have a larger ‘problem load’ 
than others when it comes to the risk of precariousness. The self-employed 
(without employees), especially the bogus self-employed, might be at greatest 
risk of precariousness. They are normally not covered by collective agreements 
and therefore miss a large range of social benefits, including occupational pen-
sions. No precise figures exist regarding self-employed’s membership in unem-
ployment funds or trade unions. However, research has revealed that many face 
an increased risk of restricted access to unemployment funds as they often have 
to give up their business to qualify for unemployment benefits or have difficul-
ties generating enough weekly hours to qualify. Some self-employed can be 
considered bogus self-employed -de facto employees forced by their employers 
to register as self-employed. However, being self-employed is also a voluntary 
choice for many, and for some it is a good opportunity to increase earnings 
compared to being employed. So the picture is mixed. Also in the top end of the 
risk of precariousness scale – and maybe above the self-employed – are CEE 
workers (not an employment type but a group of workers analysed in the pro-
ject), many of whom rank near the bottom on all or nearly all dimensions dis-
cussed.  
Large shares of temps, fixed-term employees and marginal part-timers are 
covered by collective agreements, but recent studies have suggested that whilst 
fixed-term workers often are union members, this is less so the case regarding 
temps and marginal part-time workers. Regarding  access to unemployment 
funds, these groups have difficulties meeting the assessment criteria for unem-
ployment benefits even if they are members of an unemployment fund. Thus, 
these employment types face an increased risk of precariousness across all sec-
tors compared to full-time employees on open-ended contracts. This is particu-
larly so with respect to accessing social benefits, although some sectors have 
lowered thresholds regarding accrual rights in recent years. Moreover, their 
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voice is less often heard at the company level, their access to training is often 
restricted, they face a greater risk of losing their jobs during periods of econom-
ic hardship etc. Because they often have open-ended contracts, marginal part-
timers might be better off than temps and fixed-term employees. However, this 
depends on the circumstances, and it is therefore not possible to create a hierar-
chy between the three types of employment.  
 
7.2 Variations in social partners’ responses  
Starting again with the general picture, the Danish trade unions have had diffi-
culties in deciding how to address several of the employment types that are 
described as atypical and precarious work in the present project. Ignoring the 
differences between the various unions and focusing on their positions on atypi-
cal and precarious work in general, it would be fair to describe these as having 
developed during the last two decades from trying to reduce such types of em-
ployment towards trying to improve their pay and conditions. However, this 
development is not seen to the same extent with regard to all types of precarious 
employment. Moreover, when it comes to some types of employment, the two 
strategies coexist. 
The employers’ positions on atypical or precarious work have, not surpris-
ingly, been different from the unions. Ignoring the differences between the em-
ployers’ associations and concentrating on the more general positions towards 
atypical work, employers have, generally speaking, embraced flexible working. 
They have tried to relax the rules and regulations in order to increase flexibility, 
but at the same time they have also agreed to improve and ensure the wages and 
working conditions of atypical workers during collective bargaining rounds. 
Regarding the four selected sectors, the social partners’ responses do to 
some extent follow a pattern with the employment types with the most severe 
problems seeing the most responses. However, the pattern does not apply to all 
four case studies. This is often due to social partners’ diverging interests but can 
also be because the trade unions (the de facto driver behind many of the initia-
tives) have not given a potential precariousness problem high enough priority. 
Although it is mostly the trade unions that have pushed for initiatives, there are 
also examples of employer-led initiatives as described in the sector chapters.  
As previously noted, atypical work is not always precarious, and the contin-
ued existence of atypical employment represents a legitimate interest of em-
ployers (see Mailand and Larsen, 2011). Consensus between the social partners 
on counteracting atypical work cannot always be taken for granted. This is un-
surprising considering that the view of the Danish Confederation of Employers 
(DA) is that part-time work, TAW, fixed-term work and self-employment are 
not considered precarious (see chapter 2). According to DA, this is so because 
these types of employees – whether they are employed on part-time or fixed-
term contracts or are working as temps – are equal to other types of employees 
‘in social and juridical terms’, if they are covered by a collective agreement. DA 
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also argues that the thresholds for earning the right to social benefits have been 
reduced in the collective agreements and that other differences between these 
and other employment types are minimal. Moreover, DA believes that part-time 
work tends to be voluntary and that atypical employment is an important step-
ping-stone to more attractive positions, especially for youth, and is important 
for employers. Focus should therefore shift from reducing this type of employ-
ment to covering the still-uncovered parts with collective agreements (DA, 
2013).  
The Danish trade unions have a slightly different perspective on these mat-
ters. Naturally, they appreciate the extension of collective bargaining to cover 
most types of atypical employees as well, but point to problems of precarious-
ness in the part of the labour market not covered by collective agreements and 
to pockets of ‘de jure’ unequal treatment and especially ‘de facto’ inequality in 
sectors covered by collective agreements. The latter can, in some cases, be ex-
plained by non-compliance with regulations, but also most importantly by atyp-
ical employees not meeting the thresholds for earning social benefits.  
Regarding hospitals, reflecting the lack of widespread precariousness prob-
lems, the social partners’ initiatives to address problems have been few, and 
most of them have been initiated at a level above the regions/hospitals. This is 
not to say that problems related to precariousness are totally absent in the hospi-
tals. The social benefit thresholds problem has been mentioned. Moreover, a 
number of part-time positions under the heading of ‘hourly paid employees’ 
among other health and support staff have until recently lacked pension rights 
and paid sick leave and had a shorter term of notice and possibly also marginal 
part-time–related problems. However changes in the collective agreements im-
plemented in August 2014 might reduce this problem. It is noteworthy that this 
change was made due to pressure from the European Commission and not the 
social partners’ own initiative. Moreover, although an in-depth study about the 
quality of the work environment did not indicate an overall worsening, there is 
no doubt that some hospital occupations and departments have serious work 
environment problems, including work intensification. This problem is not lim-
ited to atypical employees. 
Regarding the social partners’ initiatives to address the problem of precari-
ous workers in construction, these have been few regarding employment types 
but many regarding CEE workers. This study leaves us with the impression that 
CEE workers receive more attention than their number justifies and Danish 
atypical workers less. However, measurement problems and insufficient infor-
mation regarding some employment types prevent us from being sure about that 
conclusion. Trade unions and employers have partly overlapping interests in 
restricting some forms of competition from foreign companies and employees. 
Some initiatives have been related to European directives; others have been 
bipartite or tripartite. A common goal of the initiatives has been to ensure that 
the collective agreements are respected and that collective bargaining can con-
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tinue to be the prime mode of regulating wages and conditions in the sector so 
that more legislation and a statutory minimum wage can be avoided despite the 
pressure on the collective bargaining–based model.  
To increase the collective agreements’ coverage, social partners in the TAW 
sector have relied on two strategies, and as a result a complex web of collective 
agreements exists, where temps are covered by the collective agreements of the 
user company in some sectors, whilst in others they are covered by collective 
agreements signed by the social partners representing the agency and the temps 
within a specific occupation. In yet other sectors, temps are covered only by 
legislation because social partners have been unable to come to an agreement. It 
is primarily the implementation of the EU’s directive on TAW, which came into 
force in 2013 that has ensured equality in wages and working conditions for 
temps without collective agreement coverage. However, the directive may also 
have pushed up TAW on the agenda of social partners. Indeed, it is questionable 
whether the sector’s social partner organisations would have agreed to include 
salaried workers employed at user companies in their collective agreements 
without the directive lurking in the background. Although many initiatives by 
social partners have been developed jointly to ensure reasonable wages and 
working conditions for temps, the responses have often been initiated by the 
unions and then negotiated with and agreed to by the employers. However, the 
employers have also themselves launched some initiatives.  
Atypical work has also been on the bargaining agenda of social partners 
within industrial cleaning in order to improve wages and working conditions of 
atypical workers although they rarely use this term. It is particularly fixed-term 
workers with very short contracts – so-called call temps – temps, subcontractors 
and the (bogus) self-employed that have attracted the attention of social part-
ners. The unions and the employers’ associations have jointly and individually 
developed initiatives with some success. These have included lowering the 
thresholds for accruing rights to social benefits and adding new social rights to, 
for example, further training, introducing new regulations for subcontractors to 
prevent social dumping and unfair competition, improving working conditions 
of temps and call temps and raising union density and collective agreement 
coverage. The unions have typically proposed the responses and then negotiated 
them with the employers, which have agreed to them. However, the employers 
have also initiated responses with some success, such as an initiative regarding 
a certification scheme to prevent social dumping and unfair competition and 
improve wages and working conditions within industrial cleaning – an initiative 
that was entirely employer led but welcomed by the unions. Likewise, the mu-
nicipalities have also developed social clauses aimed at ensuring that the wages 
and working conditions outlined in the collective agreements are followed when 
cleaning assignments are up for compulsory tendering. However, some attempts 
by social partners to improve the working conditions of atypical workers have 
also failed.  
FAOS Research paper 141  
   
79 
 
7.3 Variations in drivers of recent developments  
An important question is what the drivers of the introduction and development 
of the different employment types have been. In the project’s set-up, we were 
asked to include (1) economic factors, (2) organisation of production, (3) em-
ployer strategies, (4) union strategies, (5) industrial relations, (6) government 
policies, (7) EU regulation and (8) non-compliance with rules and illegitimacy. 
Most, but not all, of these factors will be addressed in the following sector-by-
sector discussion.  
In the hospital sector, precariousness is a very limited phenomenon, alt-
hough not totally absent, as described earlier. We have not been able to find 
even ‘more or less’ development towards precariousness. Nevertheless, here are 
some of the relevant drivers and developments:  
 
 Economic factors and government policy have been important in that 
budget restraint/austerity has driven the reduction in use of (external) 
temps. However, since they are not precarious in this sector, this devel-
opment is of less importance for the present project.  
 Economic factors (shortage of nurses and nurse assistants) have also 
played a role in contributing to a wage lift of nearly all groups and em-
ployment types prior to the economic crisis, thereby counteracting pre-
cariousness.  
 Budget restraint/austerity has been of a relatively mild type, and mass 
layoffs or wage cuts in connection to these - as seen in some other EU 
member states- have not taken place. But budget restraint/austerity has 
nevertheless, maybe together with trade union strategies of DSR (alt-
hough they deny it), played a role in the recent increase in jobs for 
nurses and the decrease in jobs for nurse assistants, leading to a poten-
tial precariousness problem for the latter because of reduced job and 
employment security.  
 Demographic factors in combination with employers’ strategies are be-
hind the strategy to reduce the share of part-timers, the effect of which 
still remains to be seen. However, since part-timers cannot be seen as 
precarious workers in the hospital sector, this development is again of 
less importance.  
 Although organisational density has declined for some groups of hospi-
tal employees, it continues to be high. Combined with nearly 100 per-
cent collective bargaining coverage at public hospitals, and the fact that 
hospital employees work in a sector that is very sensitive to industrial 
conflicts and at times has had a taste for militancy, this implies that the 
hospital-related trade unions are in a relatively strong bargaining posi-
tion, which likely has contributed to the near absence of problems of 
precariousness for this group.  
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 Government (and local government) policies are behind the increases in 
wage-subsidy jobs recently seen in hospitals. It remains to be seen 
whether these will lead to problems of precariousness.  
 EU directives have played a minor role in this sector. However, the 
2013 cross-sector legislative implementation of the temporary agency 
work directive and the 2014 changes in collective agreements regarding 
some groups of fixed-term/part-time employees might have more than 
minor implications.  
 
In construction, precariousness is more of a problem and has caused some con-
cern among the social partners, especially the trade unions. Most, but not all, of 
the precariousness problems are related to labour migration. The most important 
drivers here are as follows:  
 
 Recent labour migration in the Nordic countries has been overwhelm-
ingly demand driven, and Norway, which has had strongest growth, has 
received the most CEE workers (Friberg and Eldring 2013). However, 
Denmark has also received large numbers of CEE workers. More spe-
cifically, the economic factor ‘cross-border wage difference’ is the 
most important driver. Wages for manual workers in the Danish con-
struction sector is at a level such that CEE workers can multiply their 
income by working in Denmark and is sufficiently high that a large 
number of German construction workers also choose to work in Den-
mark. 
 Importantly, the inflow of CEE workers has continued to increase since 
the economic crisis. This emphasises the role of employers’ strategies. 
In the construction sector, employers seem in many circumstances to 
prefer CEE workers to Danish workers. Lower wages, higher flexibility 
and insufficient labour supply of Danish construction workers are 
among the explanations (e.g., Andersen and Felbo-Kolding, 2013b).  
 The EU directives and EU case law have been very important for both 
facilitating and restricting labour migration and the related challenges 
of precariousness. Incongruence between Danish legislation and collec-
tive bargaining initiatives to prevent social dumping is already an issue 
and might be even more so in the future.  
 Government policies are also a very important factor here. At a time 
when tripartism at the national level has weakened, new tripartite fo-
rums for labour migration have developed. Furthermore, the centre-left 
government that came to power in 2011 has adopted the trade unions’ 
social dumping agenda.  
 Getting the government – and partly also the employers – on board 
with respect to the social dumping agenda is a major victory of the 
trade unions. In other regards, the trade unions have been less success-
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ful in dealing with the precariousness challenges. Still, the trade union 
strategies and initiatives have been key in addressing precariousness 
within the sector and will continue to be so in the foreseen future.  
 In the sector, non-compliance and illegitimacy in connection to foreign 
temps and posted workers is an important driver behind government 
and social partner initiatives to address, among other things, precari-
ousness in the sector. 
  
In the TWA sector, which in Denmark is rather small, precariousness is a prob-
lem to some extent but more so in relation to some user sectors than others. 
Collective bargaining and legal initiatives have addressed these problems and 
improved the wages and working conditions of temps. However, although pre-
cariousness has been reduced de jure, it seems not to have been reduced de facto 
to the same extent. The most important drivers are as follows:  
 
 Economic factors, such as the business cycle and labour demand, are of 
great importance to the number of temps, since it is often the employ-
ers’ strategy to use temps as buffers.  
 Trade union strategies have been an important driver. The turn in the 
strategy from avoiding and preventing TAW to attempting to cover 
temps by collective agreements is especially noteworthy. However, 
some trade unions continue to be rather sceptical of TAW.  
 Industrial relations factors are often brought to the negotiation table 
when the small size of the Danish TAW sector is to be explained. More 
precisely, it is the Danish flexicurity model which is pointed to and es-
pecially the relatively relaxed rules of hiring-and-firing. This is a plau-
sible explanation but is challenged by recent OECD studies indicating 
that the Employment Protection Legislation Index (expressing strictness 
of regulation) is not low but close to the average of OECD countries 
(OECD, 2013).  
 European directives, more specifically the temporary agency work di-
rective, have been of importance in improving the conditions of temps, 
both directly and indirectly, by guiding the focus of the trade unions 
and employers’ associations. 
 Government policies has been of importance, together with trade union 
and employer strategies, in terms of introducing legislation securing 
implementation of the temporary work agency directive  in all sectors 
other than the manufacturing industry, where it is implemented through 
collective agreement.  
 
Industrial cleaning might be the sector where the largest share of employees is 
at risk of precariousness. The drivers in this sector are as follows:  
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 Economic factors, such as outsourcing, compulsory tendering in the 
public sector and the economic business cycle, are of great importance 
to industrial cleaners in that employers often terminate their contracts, 
intensify their workloads, reduce their work hours and lay them off 
when cleaning contracts are up for re-tendering.  
 Media reports and case law have also been important drivers for im-
proving the wages and working conditions of industrial cleaners. Social 
partners’ new rules and regulations regarding, for example, the use of 
subcontractors was reportedly a direct result of media attention regard-
ing the low wages and working conditions of migrant workers within 
industrial cleaning.  
 Trade union and employer strategies have been of importance in that 
they have lowered the thresholds for accruing rights to social benefits, 
developed new rules for regulating the use of subcontractors, improved 
working conditions for call temps and temps and initiated responses to 
raise union density and collective agreement coverage.  
 Employer strategies have also been of importance for blocking initia-
tives to further develop the social rights of industrial cleaners.  
 Government policy is important insofar as both flexi-jobs and other 
types of wage-subsidy schemes exist, and public employers are obliged 
to hire a certain quota of these. The wage-subsidy positions represent a 
precariousness problem to some extent. Local government policy in 
terms of the recent development of social clauses to ensure that wag-
es and working conditions of industrial cleaners follow collective 
agreements when cleaning assignments are up for compulsory tender-
ing have also pushed the agenda of improving wages and working con-
ditions of industrial cleaners.  
 
7.4 Challenges for future social partner initiatives  
This national report has shown several challenges regarding precariousness, 
which will also represent challenges during the coming years. It would not be 
possible to discuss all these within the limits of this concluding chapter. We 
have chosen five to briefly present and discuss below.  
First, there is still room for improvement regarding the thresholds for social 
benefits concerning some types of employment. Whereas some social benefits 
can be obtained after two months of employment, accessing benefits in other 
areas still requires an employment record of 12 months or more. If equal treat-
ment is a goal, there are possibilities for future actions here. To what extent the 
social partners will pick up on this issue and continue to improve access to so-
cial benefits for atypical employees is a matter of their priorities and the power 
relations. It is noteworthy that prior to the collective bargaining round in 2015 
in the local government and regional sectors, KL, has called for a removal of all 
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thresholds regarding occupational pensions so that all employees are eligible 
from the first day of employment.  
Second, our study has shown that in several of the sectors analysed, self-
employment– including bogus self-employment– represents a challenge which 
is not easily overcome. Collective bargaining coverage is not realistic to the 
same extent that it is for ‘real’ employees of different types. A key question is 
which tools should be used here in order to ensure that large pockets of precari-
ousness do not develop among the self-employed? 
Third, labour migration represents a challenge in three sectors in our sample, 
whereas in the fourth (hospitals) it has decreased somewhat after having been 
used as a tool to meet skill shortage problems prior to the economic crisis. 
There are no signs that labour migration will diminish during the coming years. 
The social partners have been very active in addressing the challenge that CEE 
workers represent in such a way that this source of labour can still be used, but 
in a way that respects Danish labour market regulation. It happens, however, 
more and more often that the congruence of these initiatives (whether bi- or 
tripartite) with EU regulation is questioned. In other words, labour migration 
seems to challenge the relation between national and supra-national regulation.  
Fourth, work intensification/excessive workloads is a matter of concern, alt-
hough more in some sectors than others, and can potentially also be a precari-
ousness problem. In our sample, industrial cleaning is the clearest example of 
this, but it also is a matter of concern in the other sectors, although evidence that 
work intensification has taken place is not always clear.  
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Appendix A: Thresholds for accruing rights to selected social benefits within 
selected collective agreements on TAW in Denmark, 2014 
 
 DI and  
Co-industri  
DI and 3F  Dansk 
Erhverv and 
3F 
Dansk 
Erhverv  
and FOA 
Dansk 
Erhverv and 
HK  
Dansk 
Erhverv and 
LC 
Dansk Er-
hverv and 
BUPL, FOA, 
SP 
Pensions 2 months 320 hours in 
last 
2 years 
320 hours in 
last 3 years 
0 months 1,443 hours 
in last 3 
years 
or 3 months 
— 0 months 
Further training 6 months 962 hours 962 hours or 
9 months 
— 6 months — — 
Further training if 
dismissed 
6 months 1 year : — 6 months — — 
Ensured minimum 
paid hours  
4 hours  4 hours 4 hours — 4 hours 3 hours if job 
cancelled 
3 hours if job 
cancelled 
Notice period is 
permitted after 
6 months 1,924 hours 1,924 hours 
in last 15 
months 
 0 months 
(Salaried 
employees) 
hourly paid 
excluded  
0 months 
(Salaried 
employees) 
3 months 
(hourly paid) 
— 0 months 
(Salaried 
Employees) 
(hourly paid 
excluded)  
Extra holiday 
entitlements 
9 months 0 months** 0 months** — 1.443 hours 
in last 3 
years or 9 
months**  
— — 
Severance pay-
ment if dismissed  
3 years — — — - — — 
Wage supple-
ments 
Follow com-
pany-based 
agreements 
Follows 
leading 
sector’s 
collective 
agreement 
Follow’ user 
company’s 
collective 
agreement 
1 year work 
experience in 
last 3 years 
 
Local bar-
gaining  
Follow com-
pany-based 
agreement 
80 hours’ 
work experi-
ence 
Full-paid leave 
when child is 
hospitalised  
0 months 0 months* 0 months* 0 months 
(Salaried 
employees) 
(hourly paid 
excluded)  
962 hours in 
last 3 years 
or 
6 months 
— — 
Full-paid sick 
leave  
6 months 962 hours* 962 hours* 0 months 
(Salaried 
employees) 
(hourly paid 
excluded)  
0 months — — 
Full-paid materni-
ty, paternity and 
parental leave 
9 months 1,443 hours* 1,443 hours* 0 months 
(Salaried 
employees) 
(hourly paid 
excluded)  
1.443 hours 
in last 3 
years or 9 
months  
 
— — 
Full-paid short-
term leave when 
child falls ill  
0–9 months: 
statutory sick 
pay  
9 months: full 
pay  
1,443 hours* 1,443 hours* 1,443 hours 
(Salaried 
Employees) 
(hourly paid 
excluded) 
962 hours in 
last 3 years 
or 
6 months 
— — 
Losing past ac-
crued rights 
9-month 
break be-
tween two 
contracts 
12-month 
break be-
tween two 
contracts 
12-month 
break be-
tween two 
contracts 
12-month 
break be-
tween two 
contracts 
12-month 
break be-
tween two 
contracts 
— — 
Source: DI and 3F (2014); Dansk Erhverv and 3F (2014); Dansk Erhverv et al. (2014a; 2014b); Dansk Erhverv and FOA (2014); Dansk 
Erhverv and LC (2014). 
*threshold for maximum payment, **Specific percentage of salary is paid as contributions towards extra paid holiday entitlements  
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Appendix B: Thresholds for accruing rights to selected social benefits within    
selected collective agreements on industrial cleaning in Denmark, 2014 
 
 DI (SBA) 
and 3F and 
Servicefor-
bundet- 
Service 
agreements 
Danske 
Service and 
3F and 
Servicefor-
bundet- 
Service 
agreement 
DI (SBA) 
and 3F 
window 
cleaning  
Danske 
Service and 
3F window 
cleaning  
COOP  
and 3F 
KRIFA and 
Kristelig 
Arbejds-
giverforen-
ing  
KL FOA 
and 3F  
unskilled 
KL and 3F 
Pensions 2 months 2 months 7 months 0 months 3 months 9 months 10 months 
or 
52 weeks 
with 8 
weekly 
hours within 
8 years** 
10 months 
 
52 weeks 
with 8 
weekly 
hours within 
8 years** 
 
Further train-
ing on basic 
qualifications  
6 months 6 months 0 months 0 months — — Local 
 bargaining 
Local  
bargaining 
Further train-
ing 
6 months 6 months 6 months 9 months  — No specific 
right 
Local  
bargaining 
Local  
bargaining 
Rights to an 
individual 
educational 
plan 
6 months 6 months 0 months 0 months — No specific 
right 
Local  
bargaining 
Local  
bargaining 
Further train-
ing if dis-
missed  
Local  
bargaining 
Local  
bargaining 
2 years 1 year — — Local bar-
gaining 
Local 
 bargaining 
Ensured mini-
mum paid 
hours  
15 hours 
per week* 
 
3 hours** 
15 hours 
per week* 
 
3 hours** 
— — 4 hours 3 hours** 3 hours** 3 hours** 
Notice period 
is permitted 
after 
0 months 
(2 weeks) 
0 months 
(2 weeks) 
0 months (1 
week) 
0 months 
(1 week) 
0 months 
(14 days) 
0 months 
(salaried 
employees) 
3 months 
(non-
salaried 
workers) 
Short-term 
contracts 
excluded 
0 months 
(salaried 
employees) 
3 months  
(hourly 
paid) 
0 months 
(salaried 
employees) 
3 months  
(Hourly 
paid)  
Extra paid 
holiday enti-
tlements 
9 months 
0–9 
months*** 
0 months*** 
 
0 months*** 
 
0 months*** 0 months*** 
 
9 months 
within 12 
months 
0 months*** 0 months*** 
Severance 
payment  if 
dismissed  
10 years — - — — - 12 years 12 years  
Wage supple-
ments 
12 months 
only per-
manent 
staff 
12 months 
only per-
manent 
staff 
3 months 6 months Local bar-
gaining 
Local bar-
gaining 
Local bar-
gaining 
Local bar-
gaining 
Full-paid leave 
when child is 
hospitalized  
0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 
Full-paid sick 
leave  
6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months 3 months 9 months 0 months 
Hourly paid 
excluded 
0 months 
Full-paid 
maternity, 
paternity and 
parental leave 
9 
months**** 
  
9 
months**** 
 
9 months 9 months 9 months 9 months 
within last 
12 months 
0 months 
 
Hourly paid 
excluded 
0 months 
Full-paid short- 6 months 6 months 6 months 6 months — 0 months 0 months 0 months 
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term leave 
when child 
falls ill  
Health related 
services 
2 months 2 months — — — - - - 
Losing rights if 
employment 
break 
6 months 6 months - - - - 1 month 1 months 
Source: DI (SBA) et al. (2014); DI and 3F (2014a; 2014b); RSBA et al. (2012); RSBA and 3F transportgruppen (2012); KL et al. (2013); 
KL and 3F (2013); COOP and 3F transportgruppen (2013); KRIFA and Kristelig Arbejdsgiverforening (2013).  
* part-time workers. ** fixed-term workers, call temps. *** Specific percentage of salary is paid as contributions towards extra paid holi-
day entitlements **** threshold for maximum pay. 
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Appendix C: The threshold for accruing rights to selected social benefits within 
selected collective agreements on construction in Denmark, 2014 
 Danish Con-
struction Asso-
ciation  and 3F 
Construction 
Group agree-
ment 
Danish Con-
struction Asso-
ciation  3F-
industrial 
agreement 
Danish 
Painting 
Masters and 
Painters 
Union 
agreement 
Danish Craft 
and 3F- 
Construction 
Group 
agreement 
Danish 
Painting 
Masters and 
3F Construc-
tion Group 
agreement 
Danish Construction 
Association  and  
3F- Masonry agree-
ment 
Pensions 6 months 6 months 3 months 6 months 3 months 6 months 
Further training on 
basic qualifications  
: : : : : : 
Further training 3 months Local bargaining  
 
6 months 3 months 6 months 3 months 
Rights to an indi-
vidual educational 
plan 
3 months Local bargaining : : : : 
Further training if 
made redundant  
: : : : : : 
Ensured minimum 
paid hours  
20 hours per 
week***** 
 
4 hours** 
15 hours per 
week*****/**** 
 
4 hours** 
15 hours per 
week***** 
8 hours per 
week***** 
15 hours 
Per 
week***** 
15 hours per 
week***** 
Notice period is 
permitted after 
1 year 6-9 months**** 1 year 8 weeks 1 year 0 months – but is 
only 2 days notice 
Extra paid holiday 
entitlements 
0months*** 0 months*** 0 months*** 0 months*** 0 months*** 0 months*** 
Severance  
payment if  
dismissed  
: : : : : : 
Wage supple-
ments 
Local bargaining 3-12 months**** 
Local bargaining 
Local  
bargaining 
Local  
bargaining 
3 months 
Local  
bargaining 
Local bargaining 
Full pay leave 
when child is 
hospitalised  
0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 0 months 
Full pay during 
sick leave  
3 months 
Or 3 months 
within last 18 
months* 
3 -6 months**** 6 months 3 months 3 months 3 months within the 
last 18 months 
Full pay during 
Maternity, paternity 
and parental leave 
 6 months within 
last 18 months 
6 months within 
the last 18 
months 
9 months 6 months 9 months 
within the 
last 18 
months 
6 months 
Full pay during 
short-term leave 
when children falls 
ill  
0 months 0 -5months**** 6 months 0 months 6 months 0 months 
Health related 
services 
 No specified 
rights 
No specified 
rights 
 
0 months No specified 
rights 
 
: No specified rights 
 
Losing rights if 
employment break 
9 months 9 months 1 year 9 months : : 
Source: 3F and Dansk Byggeri (2014a; 2014b, 2014c) Danske malermestre og Malerforbundet (2012), Danske malermestre and 3F 
(2014); Dansk Håndværk and 3F (2013). 
 *if working on a non-permanent workplace **call temps *** Specific percentage of salary is paid as contributions towards extra paid 
holiday entitlements ****Depends on employee group, *****part-time workers 
 
